




# Bulletin

Vol. XXXVII, No. 945

August 5, 1957



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

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August 5, 1957

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# The Rule of Law Among Nations

by Under Secretary Herter<sup>1</sup>

It is said to be a pity that youth must be wasted on the young, and I think it is a parallel thought that it is unfortunate that the only witnesses to great events are often those involved in them. Just as the young are largely unaware until afterward of the blessings of youth, so people like ourselves, involved as we are in the convolutions of a changing world, are often so much concerned with our own segment of the struggle that we overlook the broader drama in which we play our parts.

With the thought, then, of contributing somewhat to a perspective view, I wish to spend my time tonight considering what your field, which is the law, is contributing to my field, which is diplomacy; and what diplomacy, in turn, is contributing to the development of international law. The events of the past few months in the Middle East are of great significance in this connection, so I want to give particular attention to them.

Not being a lawyer, I speak, of course, as a layman.

It seems to me quite evident that one of the basic facts of this age of thermonuclear weapons is that law itself must occupy a higher place in it than in previous ages. Until fairly recently war was both a legal and a pragmatic means of settling international disputes. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, however, some 30 years ago outlawed war as an instrument of policy; and then came the charter of the United Nations, which forbids resort to armed force unless authorized by the United Nations or undertaken in defense against armed aggression. And now that thermonuclear weapons dominate the scene, war has also become so annihilating, even for the victor, that it is unthinkable that it should be used except as a defensive weapon.

The rule of law must therefore in great measure supplant the rule of war as the final arbiter of international intercourse, if this intercourse is to continue at all.

## The Fabric of Social Order

The fabric of social order is woven from a number of strands. In the first place law and custom, written or unwritten, reflect the consensus of the community as to what action is right and reasonable. Second, there is some established and accepted means of changing these rules of action, so that they may continue to meet evolving needs and circumstances. In the third place, there is some person or agency empowered by the community to administer its law. Fourth, there are organs of judgment which resolve disputes under the law. Fifth, there should be physical force sufficient to deter violence by its capacity to punish breaches of the law. Finally, there must be sufficient material and spiritual health to cause people to act in reasonable and peaceful ways rather than to be driven by need, or fear, to acts of violence.

There already exist the strands for weaving a world social order, but they are incomplete or imperfect, or have not yet been fully woven into the fabric of international life. A considerable body of international law exists—in the United Nations Charter, in so-called treaty law, and in that body of custom and practice which has attained the status of rules of international law. But the total still falls far short of what is needed to establish the rule of law among nations.

To be sure, change in the law is provided for under the United Nations Charter and comes, in addition, through developments in treaty law. But still the process of change has not become

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Bar Association at New York, N. Y., on July 15 (press release 423).

certain enough or orderly enough to insure that it will be peaceful.

Administration and enforcement of the law is, under the charter, placed in the hands of the Security Council, and the charter provides that the Council shall have at its disposal armed forces needed for preserving the peace. Unfortunately the intransigent Soviet attitude has defeated for the time being this original purpose, and in consequence the free nations found it necessary to agree to regional mutual assistance treaties for their common defense, as permitted by the United Nations Charter. They have also found it necessary to improvise voluntarily collective military action to meet specific situations such as Korea.

The International Court of Justice is in being to fulfill the judicial function, but to date the nations have been reluctant to place disputes in the hands of the Court; and there are limits to the types of controversies which can appropriately be referred to the Court. We cannot overlook the essential fact that the Court can only be effective where controversies are submitted by common agreement of the parties not only to refer their disputes to the Court but to abide by the Court's decision. Attempts to steer heated political disputes into the Court under pressure may result in disregard of its decisions and might even destroy the Court.

In many areas of the earth the absence of the necessities of life, or the fact or memory of grievance or oppression, or the fact that rulers have aggressive intentions, means that peace is on precarious ground.

Thus, if we are to hope that the rule of law can supplant the rule of force in the world, our work is clear. We must continue to develop the body of law, the institutions of social order, the habit of public acceptance and resort to law, and the social, economic, and political health which are the essential bases of a law-abiding community. As the Greek philosopher Heraclitus said: "The people must fight for their law as for their wall." I would add that the people must create their law before they can defend it.

#### **The Crisis in the Middle East**

It is often in time of gravest crisis, when law and order are most challenged and tested, that new techniques in law are invented or applied and the rule of law is thereby strengthened. It

is strengthened, that is, if the challenges are met and the tests passed. Where law is flouted or ignored, then the fabric of order can be damaged or destroyed.

The crisis in the Middle East provided a difficult test of the capacity of the free nations to deal effectively with a major dispute. While the major issues in that area are not resolved, there has been important progress both in the raising of issues and in the development of our machinery for meeting crises.

Let me review some of the developments, dealing with matters both of fact and law, as they seem relevant:

#### *Nationalization of the Suez Canal*

The Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal Company itself raised significant questions of law. The United States reserved its position on the question of the lawfulness of the purported nationalization and indicated its disposition to try to work out a practicable solution of the canal problem which would protect the legitimate interests of all concerned. It is to be hoped, however, that the interest in these questions raised by the Suez crisis will eventually result in a clarification of the rules and, as well, an addition to the body of international law.

#### *The Period of Negotiation*

The international discussions prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Egypt last fall looked toward the conclusion of an agreement which would settle the questions both of compensation and of commitments regarding future operation of the canal. Following Egypt's rejection of proposals worked out at London by a group of user nations and its failure to produce an alternative proposal, the United Nations Security Council on October 13 of last year unanimously adopted a resolution—with the concurrence of Egypt—which set forth six agreed requirements for a settlement governing the canal.<sup>2</sup> These principles covered the operation of the canal without discrimination, respect for Egypt's sovereignty, isolation of operation of the canal from the politics of any country, the setting of tolls, the maintenance of the canal, and the resolution of disputes between Egypt and the Canal Company.

In recent months the canal has been opened

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1956, p. 616.

again to normal traffic. A number of nations, including the United States and other maritime powers, have agreed to give the Egyptian canal regime a trial on a *de facto* basis. It remains to be seen what kind of permanent regime for the canal will emerge and whether existing machinery will in fact be used for the settlement of any differences regarding its operation.

#### The Hostilities

The process of negotiating a Suez Canal settlement was interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities in the Near East late last October.

An outbreak of armed conflict raises immediately the question as to when the use of force is justified and when it is not. Collective military action was recommended by the Security Council of the United Nations in order to prevent the conquest of the Republic of Korea by Communist invaders. As to the recent events in the Middle East, President Eisenhower stated on October 31<sup>3</sup> that the action against Egypt could scarcely be reconciled with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and there was overwhelming support of this position by the General Assembly when it adopted a cease-fire resolution.<sup>4</sup>

The use of force in these times raises not only the question of its justification, or lack of it, but the question of the danger that hostilities will spread and by their spreading ignite all-out war.

#### Cease-Fire

Time will show, perhaps, that some of the most valuable developments of recent years in the United Nations as an institution came from the successful efforts to bring an end to the hostilities in Egypt.

The Security Council was prevented by vetoes from taking effective action to deal with the situation. An emergency special session of the General Assembly was summoned under the uniting-for-peace resolution—the first time this procedure has been invoked and therefore a landmark in United Nations history. Through this type of action the disability brought about by the use of the veto in the Security Council has in some measure been alleviated.

The General Assembly took three kinds of ac-

tion: first, as already noted it called for a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of armed forces; second, it established a United Nations Emergency Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities;<sup>5</sup> finally, it provided for the taking of various measures designed to prevent a recurrence of old conflicts and armistice violations once the withdrawal of forces had been completed.<sup>6</sup>

The creation of the United Nations Emergency Force was another landmark in the development of the United Nations. Like the United Nations force in Korea, this new force was composed of units voluntarily contributed by member states but specifically excluding forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The similarity largely stopped there. Whereas in Korea the U.N. forces were acting under the enforcement provisions of the charter (chapter VII), in Egypt the UNEF's mission is to maintain conditions conducive to a pacific settlement. The United States was charged with the command of the U.N. forces in Korea, but the UNEF was placed under the command of an individual officer chosen by the Assembly. Moreover, the costs of the Korean forces were borne by those contributing them, whereas the UNEF forces are to be financed from the United Nations budget and from contributions of nonparticipating countries as well as by the countries supplying troops. Finally, the UNEF, unlike the U.N. force in Korea, was not intended to employ actual military force to compel either the cease-fire or the withdrawal of forces, but merely to police the areas after withdrawal.

There is still much to be done if a force such as that presently guarding the peace in Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh is to provide a useful experience and precedent for strengthening the U.N. to take action in any similar future situation. Without question, however, another significant step has been taken toward providing the United Nations with the means of making its decisions effective. The fact that France and Great Britain immediately indicated their readiness to comply voluntarily with the General Assembly resolution and the purposes of the UNEF, and that force was not required to compel the cease-fire or the withdrawal, emphasizes the significance of this step.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1956, p. 743.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 754.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1956, p. 787.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1957, p. 325.

### *Withdrawal*

The steps in obtaining a cease-fire resulted in significant developments in the United Nations as an international institution. The steps in obtaining the withdrawal of the British and French, and ultimately Israeli, forces were a promising example of the actual operation of international law.

In the General Assembly debate a preponderance of opinion was marshaled in support of the law of the charter and given expression in the Assembly's resolutions calling for cease-fire and withdrawal. Behind these resolutions was implicit the possibility of United Nations sanctions, which are open to the Assembly under articles 10 and 11 of the charter and are contemplated by the uniting-for-peace resolution. France and Britain to some degree and more especially Israel were subjected by other countries to strong pressures to comply with the Assembly's call—various and divergent as might have been the aims of those other countries.

Thus in a situation of great peril, because of the possibility of a spreading of the conflict, the nations in effect agreed to apply the law of the charter. This, as I am sure you understand, did not result from the direct application of definitive rules by an international agency endowed with governmental power as we know it in domestic law. Much painstaking negotiation was involved both inside and outside the United Nations as to the means of applying the basic proposition that military forces should be withdrawn behind the armistice lines. This was done in order to take account of legitimate concerns and interests on both sides regarding security and legal rights. In the end, common ground was reached and the law had pragmatic effect.

The forum of the United Nations and the good offices of the Secretary-General proved an extremely valuable catalyst in the process. From a practical if not constitutional point of view the office and functions of the Secretary-General developed considerably in scope and influence during the crisis. It is possible that the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, will also have an increased role to play in the future.

### *Rights of Navigation*

The Secretary-General's report of January 24<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1957, p. 275.

included among its proposals the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force at the Strait of Tiran, which commands access to the Gulf of Aqaba. The report also recalled a Security Council resolution of 1951 declaring there was no basis for Egypt's claim and exercise of belligerent rights against Israel. For several years Egypt had denied passage to Israeli commerce through the Suez Canal and had blocked Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba at the Strait of Tiran on the basis of belligerent rights.

On February 25 Mr. Hammarskjold indicated in a memorandum to the Assembly that the United Nations Emergency Force would not be withdrawn from the Strait of Tiran without prior notice to the General Assembly's Advisory Committee, which in turn could decide whether the Assembly ought to be consulted. On March 1, following discussions with France and the United States, the Israeli announcement of withdrawal included a statement of assumptions with regard to access to the Gulf of Aqaba. Finally, President Eisenhower's letter of March 2<sup>8</sup> to the Prime Minister of Israel expressed the view that it was reasonable to entertain hopes and expectations such as those voiced by the Israeli and other delegations in the Assembly.

The law can be made in different ways. The law of the sea has in a measure been strengthened through the experience and action of governments and international organizations in dealing with the Suez crisis and its aftermath. It may be further developed if at some future date the question of right of transit through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba should become the subject of consideration by the International Court of Justice.

The law of the sea will be still further strengthened and clarified, I feel sure, by the efforts of the United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea to be held in Europe next year. In this case there will be deliberate and direct efforts to codify and write law by representatives of the various members of the United Nations and specialized agencies.

I might recall in passing that the United States has a particular interest in the question of the breadth of the territorial sea, which will be considered at the conference. We hold that inter-

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 18, 1957, p. 433.

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national law does not require states to recognize a breadth of territorial sea beyond 3 miles, for it is our belief that the freedom of the seas, in its widest implications, is the principle fairest to all nations, large and small.

### Sovereignty

If the freedom of the seas and related matters are of central concern in the Suez crisis to nations using the canal, the matter of sovereignty, with all that it implies, is of central concern to all the nations of the areas of Asia and Africa which share a common pride in independence and have deeply held aspirations for economic and social development to match their political freedom. We in America cannot properly question this pride and these aspirations, for their situation of today was ours only a few generations ago, when we won our own freedom to join the circle of independent states.

One of the most delicate points in achieving even the present limited resolution of the Middle East crisis was to respect Egypt's sovereignty while at the same time satisfying the desire of other nations for the protection of their rights and for freedom of the seas. One of the questions involved in further development of the capacity of the United Nations to deal with international disputes is that of insuring that its function can be effectively carried out while at the same time the sovereignty of individual nations is respected.

The events of recent troubled times illustrate again that sovereignty, like citizenship, involves obligations as well as rights. Freedom has been defined as the opportunity for self-discipline, and experience shows that this applies to the freedom of nations as well as to that of men. A rule of law cannot exist except among those who will respect it.

In a recent speech Secretary Dulles summed this up succinctly. "International communism," he said, "is on the prowl to capture those nations whose leaders feel that newly acquired sovereign rights have to be displayed by flouting other independent nations. That kind of sovereignty is suicidal sovereignty. . . . we want the new independence of others to be something better than a brief twilight preceding the blackout of Communist despotism."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, May 6, 1957, p. 715.

### The Limits of Law

I have reviewed with you today some thoughts about the place of law in our world, have considered briefly what are the elements required to develop the rule of law, and have touched on some important recent developments in the field of international law.

In expounding the *need* for law, however, we must be clearly aware of the *limits* of law. The rule of law cannot exist without the presence of that physical force sufficient to deter violent infractions. And the responsibility thrust upon us by our position of leadership in the world today has made it mandatory that, in concert with nations which share our beliefs, we maintain a posture of collective strength and the courage and resolution to use that strength where it is needed in guarding peace and order.

But, as we need armament to safeguard the rule of law, so we need law to hold armament within healthy and desirable limits. It is said that the excess of any virtue may easily become a vice. If it is a virtue to be sufficiently armed, it may be a vice to be overly armed. Overarmament drains the wealth of nations, it preoccupies their thoughts in unhealthy directions, it can produce a kind of "trigger happy" tension which any accident could set off. Within the frame of strength which is the indispensable first element—I repeat, the indispensable first element—of a peaceful world, intelligent and prudent limitation of armament will make our strength not less effective but more so and can contribute in a very major way to the maintenance of stable and honorable peace. There is much to be done in developing a body of law and practice in this field.

I have dealt with law today largely in its negative or preventive sense—the outlawing of war, the limiting of armaments. Let me say in closing, however, that the positive, permissive aspects of law will be at least as important as the negative ones in their contribution to the future of the world.

The nations of Europe have under consideration at this moment treaties for a common market and for joint peaceful development of the atom. These developments hold promise of increased strength and independence for these nations and for the area as a whole. Such developments must inevitably break important new ground in international law. The skill with which the law is

formulated can determine in substantial measure the success of these developments.

History records both splendid successes and tragic failures in man's efforts to bring about the rule of law at the various levels of his social relationships. I believe that the further development of the rule of law among nations must come through a slow evolutionary process. It will depend in the first instance on the growth of mutual comprehension among all nations of the *need* for the peaceful machinery of law and of the horrors of the alternative machinery of war. Thereafter it will depend on the spread of confidence born

of experience slowly accumulated in practical application of the machinery and techniques of law.

In the final analysis, though, this development cannot go forward unless men everywhere are willing to make sacrifices of their personal and parochial prerogatives to the common welfare of the world community. It is this spirit which you as lawyers can help to foster through the respect which you enjoy in your local communities. By this service you can help build greater strength into the body of international law and bring to posterity greater hope of peace, prosperity, and—most important—survival.

## Secretary Dulles' News Conference of July 16

Press release 425 dated July 16

*Secretary Dulles: Any questions?*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your estimate of the significance of the breakup in the Kremlin which occurred since the last time we had a conference here?*

A. I anticipated that question and have notes from which I will read:

The rulers of Russia face a rising, and in the long run irresistible, demand of the people for more personal security, more personal freedom, and more enjoyment of the fruits of their labor. The ruling group, the Presidium, then with 11 voting members, was sharply divided as to how to cope with the situation.

The "fundamentalists" in the Presidium seem to have believed that the only course was to maintain absolute centralized power in the Kremlin and to rule from there with a rod of iron, in accordance with the Stalin example. The "modernists" seem to have believed that it was better to give an appearance at least of flexibility and allow the people at least to hope for changes that would improve their lot.

The latter policy, highlighted by Khrushchev's plan for industrial decentralization, won out by a narrow margin due to his adroit tactics in calling in the Central Committee with 318 members, which he had packed with his adherents. This provided

him with a victory which he could not win in the Presidium alone.

The whole affair showed how powerful must be the forces for change which are at work within Russia and how perplexed the rulers must be as to how to cope with these forces and at the same time maintain absolute power.

What has happened confirms the existence in Russia of what I have called an irreversible trend.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, your remarks would indicate that you interpret this affair as entirely a matter of internal politics within the Soviet Union. Is that correct?*

A. I think it was primarily a matter of internal politics and the question of how to cope with the internal pressures which were manifesting themselves within the Soviet Union.

### Promoting the "Irreversible Trend"

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe this Government can do anything either to exploit or to promote this evolutionary process you are talking about—this irreversible process, or is it the policy of the Government to have the Russians handle it and see what happens?*

A. I think we have done quite a bit to promote this trend. I think the big beginning was made at the Summit Conference, and I recall, following

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that conference, we sent out a circular letter to our embassies explaining that conference and indicating we felt there was such an irreversible trend which had begun and suggested various ways we might promote it.

The ability to do so is limited, and obviously, if there is any governmental interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, that would be counterproductive. But as there is a greater knowledge on the part of the educated people of Russia—and more and more of them are being educated—their minds become more inquiring. They seek to know more about what goes on. They listen more to the radio. They get, sometimes through the underground channels, literature which is otherwise officially denied to them, and there are quite a few processes going on which we believe Americans can, to some extent, help.

Of course the basic thing in all these situations is the desire of the people, which is inbred in all human beings, to have what I referred to here as greater personal security, greater personal freedom, freedom of thought and of conscience, and greater enjoyment of the fruits of their labor. Those are the basic forces.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that you thought that the rulers in the Kremlin were perplexed, but you made an interesting choice of terms in equating the Molotov group as "fundamentalists" ruling with a rod of iron and the Khrushchev group of "modernists" as flexible, which would seem to invite the inference you were less displeased with the way things are developing in favor of the "modernists" over the "fundamentalists" and that this was a process of some kind of evolution. Is that a fair inference?*

A. I didn't intend to indicate approval of either wing. I did think that the policy represented by what I call the "fundamentalists" would be more apt to lead to a violent explosion whereas the more flexible approach of Khrushchev may promote an evolutionary trend. But it is highly speculative to try to figure out the future in those respects.

*Q. In the expression "violent explosion" you refer to the internal affairs?*

A. That's right.

*Q. Do you then interpret the proceedings of the last week or so of maneuvering as something which was dictated entirely by the internal pres-*

*sures and one which did not involve the struggle for power between individuals?*

A. Well, I think there was certainly a power struggle by individuals. But I think, as in most cases, the seekers for power did so by identifying themselves with certain policies. It seems to me that there was a rather clear line of separation between what you might call the Stalinist "fundamentalists" and those who want to take new and different approaches to the problem. Khrushchev, by his appeal to the masses and his promise to give them more milk and butter and eggs than the United States produces, indicated that he was seeking to win a measure of popular favor.

Perhaps also significant is that in the large body of the Central Committee, while to some extent it was, as I say, a packed committee, still it was, as a larger body, more of a popular body, and the policies that Khrushchev identified himself with seem to have had a greater appeal there.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that this irreversible trend has been helped somewhat by the cultural exchanges, and, if so, would they help if we had those with Red China, as Senator Magnuson suggested?*

A. I don't think one can generalize about cultural exchanges in general. Sometimes there is benefit to the forces that we want to assist in cultural exchanges, and sometimes there is not. I would say that the stage of development within the Soviet Union is such that change is more apt to be promoted by cultural exchange than in the case of Communist China, which has not evolved as far as the Soviet Union in developing an important scientifically educated group.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel this will make a change in the Russian tactics in the cold war?*

A. There is no particular evidence it will involve any change in foreign policy. Indeed, the allegations are that foreign policy will remain unchanged because it is said that the foreign policies of the last 2 years have been the foreign policies of this group, and the charge against Molotov is not that he made bad foreign policy but that he sought to obstruct the "good" foreign policies which were sponsored by Khrushchev and Bulganin.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any significance in your not making any mention of Zhukov and the Red Army in its internal upheaval?*

A. The only significance to be drawn from my not mentioning Zhukov is the fact that it is not yet clear and demonstrable precisely what role Zhukov played. There is an inference, supported by the interpretation of a number of foreign Communist Parties—that is, foreign to Russia—that Zhukov did play a considerable role. I think it is a fair inference he may have done so. We have no hard evidence as yet as to the role he played. Of course it is apparent now he is supporting Khrushchev, and I think only yesterday in his speech he spoke of the three ousted members of the Presidium as the three "monstrosities." So he is certainly now fully behind Khrushchev as against the Molotov, etc., group.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the business of the "modernists" internally, are you accepting Khrushchev's effort to put Molotov and Malenkov in the same boat, in view of the fact that it was Malenkov, after Stalin's death, who originally talked about doing some more for the people and then was junked by Khrushchev, who was Premier.*

A. All I can say is that in this recent affair Khrushchev seems to have put them in the same boat. Whether they belong there or not I don't know.

#### **Question of German Claims**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when German Chancellor Adenauer was here, he said an agreement had been reached to have discussions between the German Ambassador and the State Department on possible returns of German war assets. What is the present status of these discussions?*

A. Well, we have had such discussions. So far, we have not come to any concrete proposal which goes beyond the proposal which we made a year or two ago which would involve the return of all of the assets to claimants up to \$10,000 a person. That would take care in full, I think, of 97 percent of the claimants. It would not deal with some of the big corporate claimants. Now that matter is still under discussion, but no conclusions have yet been arrived at.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any advantage to be gained—Would you favor making a personal tour of the countries in eastern Europe behind the Iron Curtain, as has been suggested?*

A. Well, I don't feel that that would be a proper

or productive use of my time, as things now are. I do not travel about the world for the purpose of gathering firsthand information about conditions in foreign countries. Of course, in the countries with which we have diplomatic relations we have a large staff of people who are specifically trained for that job and who are on the job every day of the year. I think a Secretary of State must rely primarily upon them to give him information. If he tries to substitute personal visits and personal impressions, which are necessarily based on a very short and partial observation, I think he would often gain a distorted view. We have in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe upwards of 200 trained Americans who are engaged in that job. I would doubt very much if it would be profitable for a Secretary of State himself to take that on as a personal task.

You see, when I go about, I go to conferences. When I go to Bonn for a conference of NATO, as I did last May, I do not go to Bonn to study conditions in Germany—I rely upon the Ambassador and his staff to advise me about those. When I go to Australia for a meeting of the SEATO Council, as I did last March, I don't go there to study conditions in Australia—I rely upon our Embassy and its staff to advise me about that. I do not think that the Secretary of State can properly make himself a personal student of affairs in all the foreign countries, some 80, with which we have diplomatic relations.

#### **Disarmament Talks**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, we seem to get contradictory reports coming out of London and Paris, and from our own delegations in London at the disarmament conference. Could you give us your assessment and possibly explain why there is more optimism on our side than there is out of Paris and London?*

A. I understand that there are reports which—from British sources at least, perhaps French—are somewhat pessimistic. I do not myself have any view in terms of whether or not there is likely to be a result. The problems ahead are immense, terribly complicated. After you reach an agreement in principle, the problem of translating that principle into something that is detailed and workable presents tremendous difficulties, and we have not even approached those yet. I think it would be very premature to have come to any conclusion as to whether there is likely to be a success or a

failure. I think all we can do is to keep pushing ahead as resourcefully, as determinately as we can to try to get a result. So far there have not emerged any absolute obstructions to progress. And as long as there is not an absolute obstruction to progress, we keep working ahead.

*Q. Do you favor a recess then, sir, at some time, say August 1, as has been discussed, until fall, or do you favor continued negotiations?*

A. Well, I don't favor a recess merely as a way of suspending work. There are times when a recess helps to make progress because it enables the delegations to reassess the situation with their governments. We had such a recess, I think, over Easter when there was a review of the situation here; and it is possible, for example, that after the American proposals have been fully explained and put forward—it is possible that the Soviet delegation might want to recess in order to go back and study the situation. If they did, then a recess would be constructive. But to recess merely because we are tired or people want a holiday I don't think is an adequate reason or, least of all, because they are discouraged as to the possibility of progress. There is no discouragement now present or demonstrated which justifies just suspending work.

*Q. From our standpoint then, sir, unless the Soviets request the recess, for the reason you have mentioned, we are prepared to continue more or less indefinitely. Is that correct?*

A. That's correct.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, why are the American proposals being presented in such a long time instead of a package?*

A. Because the American proposals involve in certain aspects quite a few of our allies, and because we do not feel in a position to lay down proposals to the Russians which involve our allies without having fully explored them first with our allies.

Now the Soviet Union is in a different position: It can take positions which involve East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the like. It doesn't have to consult them at all. It can decide what it wants knowing that it can impose its views upon them. They don't have to be brought into consultations.

But when we deal with problems which involve

the future use of fissionable material, the possibility of a European zone of inspection—all of that involves, very deeply, our allies. It is important that we explain the matter fully to them, that we take account of their views, and this is not a quick process.

Our own position in its present form was only arrived at after a good many weeks of intensive study by ourselves. It was arrived at only last spring. And the problem of keeping our allies fully informed, being assured what we did had their concurrence and support, that is nothing that we can shortcut with deference to the independent sovereign position of our allies.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to the shakeup in Moscow for a moment, and to clarify an earlier answer, is it your view that the process there is somewhat automatic and does not require any change in American policies to meet it or to promote this process?*

A. Well, I think that the policies that we have been pursuing are policies which are designed, insofar as we can properly or effectively influence the situation, to encourage the aspirations of the people for the things which I have mentioned and to bring to their knowledge what those possibilities are under a freer society. Now, that we have been doing; if and as further opportunities arrive for doing that, we will take advantage of them. But the basic policies of our Government, I think, would remain unchanged.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in referring to the ability of the Soviet Union to impose its views on the satellites, you left out Red China. Do you think, sir, that the Soviet Union could impose its views in the question of disarmament upon Red China?*

A. Well, that is a difficult question to answer categorically. I certainly think that Red China has a greater degree of independence than the European satellites. On the other hand, when it comes to matters of armament, the dependence of China upon Soviet Russia is so nearly complete that I would doubt very much if in that area Red China would try to take a different position from that of the Soviet Union.

#### Middle East

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the recently increased tensions in the Middle East, is it prudent*

*for us to send, as reported, jet-trained pilots and arms to Saudi Arabia and to send arms to Jordan, or any other Arab state, in face of public declarations by Arab leaders against the peace movement efforts in the Middle East?*

A. We do not think that there are any developments in the Middle East which should lead us to alter the policy which we arrived at when King Saud was in this country.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, as a followup to that question, the situation in the Middle East seems to be quiescent on the surface, but the basic conflicts between Israel and the Arab States have not been solved at all. How long do you think that situation can continue, and does the American Government have any intention of taking a lead in the coming Assembly of the United Nations to press for a solution of any of those matters?*

A. The basic views which we hold are expressed in my speech of August 1955.<sup>1</sup> We adhere to those views, and nothing that has happened since then leads us basically to alter the views that we then expressed.

On the question of procedures, it is perhaps necessary to adopt or find different procedures than what we then envisaged. It may be that other countries can usefully play a greater role in the situation than seemed likely at the time. It may be that the United States should not take such a prominent role as we then envisaged. I don't know whether the time is here to make progress along those lines, either totally or partially, practical. I would say that the matter is under constant study here in the State Department and we are constantly in touch with our friends in the Middle East, and whenever it seems that anything can be done, we will do all that we can to assure that it is being done, even though, perhaps, we do so more quietly.

*Q. Can you spell that out just a little more, sir, in respect to other nations' taking a more prominent role? Do you mean that a possible change, a possible withdrawal to a degree of, say, the Eisenhower Doctrine, letting other nations come in as mediators? I'm not quite clear as to—*

A. The Eisenhower Doctrine did not concern itself in any direct way with the solution to the

Palestine problem and the relations between Israel and the Arab States. The Eisenhower Doctrine dealt primarily with the menace in the area of international communism and dealt with the desirability of building up the economic and military strength of the countries of the Middle East who sought to maintain their own independence of international communism. That was the Eisenhower Doctrine. And, as I pointed out at the time, the Eisenhower Doctrine was not designed to solve the problem of the relations between Israel and the Arab States. That is a separate matter upon which our attention is deeply engaged and as to which the situation is as I have just described.

*Q. Are you alarmed at all, sir, by the shipment of jets from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, or by other indications that Egypt is attempting to use the Saudis against the Israeli on the Aqaba issue?*

A. That is a matter which, obviously, deserves consideration and is receiving it. But we have no reason to believe that the relations which we established with King Saud, particularly when he was here, have altered although, clearly, there is and always has been a difference of opinion about the international status of the Gulf of Aqaba. The Arab countries believe that the 6-mile limit applies rather than the 3-mile limit; and that, since the position of Israel on the gulf is not fixed by any permanent boundary decision, Israel does not have the right to claim a voice in the access to the gulf; and that, if the countries which do have permanent boundaries to the gulf, namely, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, agree to close the gulf, they think that they have the right to do it. There is a certain amount of plausibility from the standpoint of international law, perhaps, to those claims. That is not the view of the United States.

Perhaps in the end this matter will have to be settled by some decision of the International Court. But we do not believe that, because we have differences of that sort, that is going to bring about any fundamental change in our relations. We have differences of the same sort, as you know, with many Latin American countries. We have differences with Mexico which involve the shrimp fishing; we have differences with some of the west coast countries who have asserted territorial rights out as far as 200 miles. We dispute those. There are sharp differences that we have with many countries of the world. Our historic view about these matters is not shared by all the world,

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

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and there are differences of opinions. But honest differences of opinion between friends should not turn them into enemies.

### Atomic Weapons Development

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that as part of your disarmament proposal you have indicated to the other nations that, if they do not proceed with atomic weapons development, this country will consider revising the Atomic Energy Act and making more fissionable material and even weapons available to the allies. Could you comment on that, sir?*

A. That is an aspect of the matter which has been considered, and no definitive conclusions have been reached. Certain things are quite clear. We do not intend that atomic weapons shall not continue in existence, because the unanimous report of the scientists, including the report of the Soviet Union itself which is contained in its May 1955 proposal,<sup>2</sup> makes it perfectly clear that, as far as existing stocks of fissionable material are concerned, there can be no assurance that they can be accounted for or that surreptitious use may not be made in weapons form of existing fissionable material.

Therefore we have had to come to the conclusion that, as far as existing fissionable material is concerned, we cannot safely ourselves deny its use for weapons purposes because we cannot get any assurance that others will do the same. Therefore we predicate our proposals on the assumption that there will continue to be the use of fissionable material for weapons purposes at least to the extent that that has occurred up to the cutoff date that we propose.

Now, if that is to be the case, we do not ourselves want to be in a position where our allies are wholly dependent upon us. We don't think that is a healthy relationship. Therefore we are studying ways whereby, through perhaps a NATO stockpile of weapons and various arrangements of that sort, there can be assurances to our allies that, if they are attacked, if war comes, they will not then be in the position of suppliants, as far as we are concerned, for the use of atomic weapons. Now that may or may not require some amendment of the act. Quite possibly it would. But we do not think that we are far enough along in that path

to make it worth while to come to any definitive program of that sort. So far the Soviet Union seems to be unwilling to accept the idea of a fissionable cutoff at all, and of course, if they don't accept it, then the problem becomes academic. And also, if they are going to accept the fissionable cutoff, we don't know at all what the date would be.

A lot of things have to happen before that date comes, because there have to be large installations of supervisory machinery and so forth. So, you see, we don't know today either whether the Soviets accept the concept or what might be a possible date. Until we know those two things with greater certainty, it is not practical or desirable for us to work out any concrete program.

*Q. Does that apply, sir, only to the NATO allies, that possibility, or would it apply in any other quarter of the globe?*

A. Well, so far we have only thought about it in connection with the NATO allies. Conceivably it might apply elsewhere, but so far we have only thought about it in that connection.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the question of inspection zones as another unresolved problem between the United States and some of the allies. As far as I remember, Chancellor Adenauer, for instance, has indicated his approval of a European inspection zone. Where are the difficulties now? Could you indicate those?*

A. Well, Chancellor Adenauer indicated, as I recall, a qualified approval that assumed or presupposed that there could be a European inspection zone which would not militate against the reunification of Germany and would not seem to solidify the present division of Germany. Now that leads you right away into the question of what type of inspection you're going to have, who is going to operate it, the relationship of ground patrols to air patrols, your system of communications, and so forth. Until you get into those matters, it is very difficult to form a dependable conclusion as to whether or not these inspection zones in Europe would or would not *de facto* have the effect of solidifying the division of Germany by involving a large number of installations, bases and so forth, which would in fact be predicated upon the division of Germany. So until you get into the practical details of this matter, it is, I think, not possible to judge what its impact would be upon the political problems of Europe.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 900.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said last spring that you hoped to see a wholly new development within the North Atlantic community of consultation, not only about political matters within the community but outside. If this question of providing atomic weapons for NATO were to go through, would that not involve a much greater degree of consultation than has existed to date?*

A. I think it would be an act of confidence which would strengthen the fellowship of the North Atlantic community. You may recall this proposal was made by the French at the Bonn meeting of the NATO Council, and it has received very active consideration ever since then. We have the problem that has been alluded to of our legislation, and we have that same problem in relation to the matter of establishing intermediate missiles in the United Kingdom. There are certain things that can be done within the confines of the present legislation, other things that will require a change in that legislation. Those are highly technical problems that are being studied by the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, and we hope that there will be some conclusions on that aspect of the matter within the next few weeks perhaps. But so far there is no definite conclusion.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, with an alternative to creating a stockpile of atomic weapons for NATO, would an alternative be to provide atomic weapons to some of the principal NATO partners which were interested in having them, such as Britain and France?*

A. I think that it would be more appropriate to deal with this matter, if possible, as a NATO matter, which would not involve drawing lines of distinction as between different allies. That becomes an invidious process.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a few weeks ago Representative McCormack of Massachusetts said that you were not consulted in advance of the invitation to Marshal Tito to visit this country, and he went so far as, I believe, to suggest that there were people in the State Department who had undercut you on this matter. Is that a correct interpretation of what happened at the time the invitation was extended to Tito?*

A. The fact that he alludes to is, I think, the fact that I was at the hospital during the period when

that invitation was given. I concurred in that, of course, when I came back. If I had been here at the time, I might or might not have come to the same conclusion. But it is technically correct that I was not consulted in advance.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, who would own this NATO stockpile of atomic weapons?*

A. Well, that is one of the problems that we have to consider, whether the ownership would technically be in the United States or not. Now, SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] wears, in a sense, two hats. He is the United States representative, and he also is a representative of the NATO powers. Conceivably he might have those under his control in his capacity as an American general. And, of course, it's accepted that in time of war the President would have authority to turn such weapons over to our allies and that the present provisions of law would at that time give way to the power of the President as Commander in Chief. We are operating on that assumption now, in the training of our allies to handle atomic weapons, in the provision of equipment which is capable of handling atomic weapons, i. e., appropriate planes, weapons, and so forth. So we are proceeding on the assumption that, if there is a war, atomic weapons will be usable, at least, and may be usable by our allies.

*Q. Do you assume, sir, that, if there is such a NATO nuclear stockpile, there would automatically be a Warsaw Pact stockpile?*

A. I don't think that the Soviets have the same degree of confidence in their satellites that we have in our allies.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, coming back to the Middle East, you said that the basic view of the United States was that Israel and the Arab States would have to settle their differences and that after that the United States was willing to do certain things—Is it correct to infer from that that, while in August 1955 the implication was that Israel and the Arab countries first reach an agreement on the borders and then the United States would step in, but this time the United States would take the direct initiative to see that a settlement was reached?*

A. I think I made clear in my 1955 speech that the United States made its good offices available to assist in arriving at territorial and border ad-

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justments. Now, the situation has changed since 1955 in the sense that in 1955 the United States was not making its presence felt in the area to the same extent as is the case today, as a result of the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine. And it may be, therefore, that in this delicate task another

nation or other nations could play a more useful role in terms of good offices than the United States can. I don't know.

*Q. What other nation, Mr. Secretary?*

A. I wouldn't want to suggest names.

*Q. Thank you.*

## A United States View of the United Nations

by James J. Wadsworth

Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

My contribution to this distinguished meeting today is to bring to you, briefly, the United States view of the United Nations—which is my view personally and officially. How important is the United Nations to the United States?

If this impressive structure with its great expanse of glass, remarkable system of simultaneous translations, its superb communications all over the world did not further the best interests of its member nations, it would not long survive. This may seem like an unidealistic approach to many who see the vision of man's brotherhood, his responsibility for suffering humanity today, and his hopes for a better tomorrow. But fortunately there is no fundamental, irreconcilable conflict between the ideal and the practical. As a country, the most important thing we want but cannot achieve entirely by ourselves is peace. The peace we want is not that of a graveyard—or of a jail—but peace with freedom and with justice. Fortunately, this is the kind of peace which all of the world's people desire—and most of the world's governments.

The United Nations helps to achieve this kind of peace because it is a vital, growing concern which reflects the realities of international life.

It is not a perfect organization, because it is made up of nations and nations are made up of people and people are made up of many imperfections. As you members of the bar know all too well, people are by nature quarrelsome. Science hasn't yet revealed why this should be so, but it is an indisputable fact that *homo sapiens* for all his reasoning powers often makes a botch of his own personal relations—and not infrequently has made a botch of international relations.

Today we can no longer afford the luxury of allowing nations to "fight it out." We are impelled to find machinery for resolving our continuing conflicts if this planet is to remain habitable. The United Nations offers no cure for man's quarrelsome nature, but it does afford a place where men—and nations—can quarrel with words rather than with unleashed cosmic forces.

Twelve years ago, when the United Nations Charter was written, many people thought of international law as the major element in international relationships. International law is an extremely important bulwark against international anarchy, and I would not want to belittle its importance in any way. The United Nations International Law Commission has done and is doing good work. A very important conference on the law of the seas is being organized right now, which is one tangible result of the deliberations

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Bar Association at the United Nations, New York, N.Y., July 14, 1957 (U.S./U.N. press release 2699 dated July 12).

of the Law Commission. The International Court of Justice is a vitally important institution. Even so, I think all would agree that the United Nations has not developed along the path of peace by the application of general principles of law but rather along the quite different path of peace by practical political solutions to specific problems.

The reason why this turn was taken is clear. The world today is divided into two totally different ideologies. Between the free world and the Communist world there is no common agreement as to even what is right and what is wrong. There is no common moral code, which must be the foundation of all law.

Even words have totally different meanings when used by a Communist and when used by a believer in individual liberty. Take for example the word "democracy"; the Communists, by prefixing the word "peoples," use "democracy" to describe a dictatorship as ruthless and total as any ever known in the history of man. Or take the word "liberation"; the Communists use that word to describe the extension of Moscow's control over neighboring countries. Or the word "aggression"—when Soviet troops go into a country to repress a revolt, this is a brotherly, helpful act, never an act of aggression. By Communist definition only capitalists can be aggressors. The irony becomes excruciatingly apparent when the Soviet Union becomes the champion of covenants guaranteeing human rights.

In addition to this semantic confusion, the legal approach to peace is handicapped by the lack of machinery for enforcing agreed-upon codes of behavior. The United Nations is not a superstate. It has none of the attributes of sovereignty. It cannot pass a law, levy a tax, or conscript a soldier. And, frankly, I am sure the United States would not be a member if the United Nations could do these things.

How then, you may ask, does the United Nations go about its herculean task of promoting peace, situation by situation, case by case? How can it possibly succeed?

The answer lies in its tremendous influence—its influence on governments and ultimately on world opinion. The framers of our own Declaration of Independence recognized the importance of world opinion when they spoke of "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." Today, al-

though the United Nations has no power to compel, it has an enormous power to persuade.

#### Assets of the U.N.

There are four assets which are unique to the United Nations and which make it the influential organization that it is.

First there is the charter, which embodies a code of behavior all member nations have agreed to observe. The charter is not always lived up to by member nations, but it has an incalculable value as a standard by which nations are morally judged. They feel obliged to shape their actions to conform to its principles even when they are under great temptation to do otherwise. Any nation pays a high price in terms of international standing and influence if it cannot justify its actions in the light of the charter. The Soviet Union is indeed paying such a price right now for its utter disregard of charter principles in Hungary.

A second asset is the uniquely valuable servant of international peace, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Mr. Hammarskjold has earned great prestige for himself and for the office he occupies. He has performed services for the community of nations which no single national representative could have done. One illustration is his successful negotiation for the return of the 15 American fliers from Communist China.

Another unique asset of the United Nations is this huge assembly hall and the other meeting rooms, where representatives of 81 nations meet, annually, and in smaller groups throughout the year, on neutral ground. The United Nations is in truth a world meeting place or in the words of the charter "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations." It is a year-round meeting-place of the nations, whose representatives get to know each other's policies and points of view and who report constantly to their governments.

Fourth and finally the United Nations makes a uniquely valuable contribution in the realm of public debate and public opinion. Heads of states and foreign ministers come here every year because they know that there is no other place in the world where their views can be made known as completely and dramatically. Throughout the year high government representatives are presenting their cases, marshaling their arguments,

and finally reconciling their differences before the court of world opinion.

With these resources the United Nations has accomplished things which no one nation could possibly have done for itself—including the big and powerful United States.

At the same time we must recognize that the United Nations is not all-powerful; there are some things it cannot do. I am often reminded of the old adage that people have the strengths of their weaknesses and the weaknesses of their strengths; so it is with the United Nations. This past year has given us examples of both these weaknesses and these strengths.

The Soviet slaughter in Hungary, in complete defiance of the United Nations, was agonizing proof of how little the United Nations can do, peacefully, to restrain a country which has very great power and no morals. This is because the United Nations conforms to the realities of power in the world today—realities which the United Nations does not create but only reflects. These realities of power are built into the United Nations organization itself.

The Soviet Union as well as the United States has a privileged position at the United Nations as one of the world's big powers, and with this privileged position goes the right to the veto. The Soviets have abused the veto. But to deprive them of the veto or of their United Nations membership, even if these steps were possible, would raise the question of the United States' right to use the veto. On this right Americans have always stood firm—and I am sure will always stand firm.

Most certainly there are limits to what the United Nations can do. Yet we should not underrate the positive results that can be achieved within these limits.

#### Hungary

In the case of Hungary, although the United Nations has not yet succeeded in freeing the Hungarian people from their bondage, the United Nations *did* mobilize the conscience of the world on their behalf. It *did* send emergency supplies to help the people in their struggle. The United Nations has organized emergency assistance for the 190,000 refugees who fled from Communist terror. United Nations resolutions, by huge majorities, demanded free elections for Hungary, the withdrawal of Soviet forces, and condemned the

Soviet Union in the most forceful possible language. And the United Nations set up a fact-finding committee of five small nations to present the full facts of the situation in Hungary for all the world to know.<sup>2</sup>

By these actions the United Nations has held high the torch of liberty, ignited by Hungarian bravery. Never has a revolution been so widely known; never has an oppressor been so completely condemned. The fires of moral condemnation that were lighted here at the United Nations are plaguing the Soviet rulers today and will continue to plague them for years to come.

It is certainly possible that the worldwide indignation toward Soviet behavior in Hungary is a factor in the current upheavals in the Kremlin's high command. When a system stands condemned before the world, its rulers, in panic, start condemning each other.

We cannot, of course, know with certainty what goes on behind the Kremlin walls, but we do know that Soviet ruthlessness in Hungary and the United Nations reaction to it has had a profound impact on the Communist movement in all countries outside the Soviet orbit. There have been widespread resignations from Communist Party membership. The circulation of Communist newspapers and periodicals has fallen sharply. In local elections Communist Party candidates have lost strength.

In the so-called neutral countries—countries where most of the people are uncommitted ideologically because they are so preoccupied with the daily problem of getting enough to eat—the appeal of communism has greatly faded. The alluring phrases and promises no longer ring true. As the representative of Burma told the General Assembly last fall: "There, speaking of Hungary, but for the grace of God go we."

I am willing to venture the prediction that what the United Nations has done and will yet do in the case of Hungary will be the beginning of the end as far as communism's appeal to the minds of men is concerned. If this proves to be the case, the United Nations contribution to the cause of freedom in Hungary will have been significant and substantial, despite the limits on the direct action it could take.

<sup>2</sup> For an excerpt from the report of this committee, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1957, p. 63.

### Middle East Crisis

What now of the other crisis which the United Nations handled this past year, the threat of a world conflagration in the Middle East? Here we have a record of strong, swift action which, without doubt in my mind, headed off a third world war. If the United Nations had done only this one thing in its short life, it would have more than justified its existence.

By General Assembly resolutions—passed within a few days after the first shot was fired—massive military attacks on Egypt by three nations were brought to an end. The United Nations then created an emergency police force made up of troops from 10 small nations. This force moved in quickly, enabling the attackers to withdraw and peaceful conditions to be restored.

This is something the United States could not have done with its own troops without grave danger that the Soviet forces would also step in—which was one of the things we were working to prevent. And, in fact, since the United Nations Emergency Force has been in the area, there has been less tension and less friction than at any time in the last 10 years. Much yet remains to be done, but the United Nations has preserved peace in the Middle East and has given us a new chance to try again for real and lasting solutions to the problems of this troubled area.

In tackling the Middle East crisis of last October, which painfully divided us temporarily from three of our close and valued friends, the United Nations successfully made use of all of its unique assets: the charter, the Secretary-General, the world meetingplace, and its capacity for mobilizing world opinion. Fortunately in this crisis the nations primarily involved were responsible nations, mindful of their charter pledges and of the importance of maintaining moral standards in the world. Among such countries the United Nations system works well, and with the cooperation of such countries it will continue to grow as a bulwark of a just peace.

I have spoken today only about the United Nations as a political instrument for settling international disputes. If time permitted I would like to discuss with you the other vitally important work of the United Nations—work which improves living conditions the world over. This would take us into the exciting and strikingly successful battles against age-old diseases, which are being

waged by the World Health Organization. It would take us into the Food and Agriculture Organization, which works to banish hunger from the earth. It would take us into the activities of the Children's Fund, the Technical Assistance Program, the refugee organizations, and the other agencies which are working to buttress peace by helping people.

A complete picture of the United Nations in this phase of its work would also include the new Atomic Energy Agency, which has been a major concern of mine for the past year and a half. This is the agency which will carry out President Eisenhower's idea of sharing the atom for constructive peaceful purposes, so that atomic energy becomes a blessing to mankind rather than a malediction. Our Senate has recently approved United States participation in this new agency, and we are hopeful that enough other nations will ratify the statute for the agency in the near future so that it can come into being before the year is out.<sup>3</sup>

Time permits only a mention of this practical work that the United Nations is doing which ranges from such complex matters as the atom to such down-to-earth matters as postal services and the weather. But I do want to say that the United States regards these United Nations activities as important contributions to peace. For it is not enough to contain conflicts; it is necessary also to build constructive forces within the containers which will reduce the pressures and diminish the likelihood of future conflicts.

In all of these activities, both the political and the economic and social, it is no secret that the United States wields a tremendous influence. It is—and should be—our constant concern that we use this influence constructively.

We cannot—and do not—maintain our leadership merely because we are a great power, or merely because we are richly endowed with natural and technical resources. The United States cannot—and does not—buy friends in this international forum. We command respect when our policies are right, when they are morally just as well as politically and economically sound. It is for this reason that the United States Government

<sup>3</sup>For transmittal of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Senate, see *ibid.*, Apr. 15, 1957, p. 615; for text of statute, see *ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1956, p. 820. The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on June 18.

examines with such care each issue that comes before the United Nations, not only in the light of traditional friendships and alliances, not only in the light of ideological competition, but above all in the light of what is right and just and proper.

And finally, let me say this: our leadership at the United Nations is only as good as our national policies. These policies cannot be clearly defined—and made effective—without an informed, alert citizenry who takes the trouble, as you have today, to inform themselves about the problems of the world in which we live and the workings of this unique institution, the United Nations.

The problems we face in our quest for peace with freedom and justice are as complex and variable as human nature itself. We have learned that the willingness of the world to take common action varies from year to year and from issue to issue. Yet this is our challenge—to strive toward peace, creating community out of discord and order out of community.

## **President Names Douglas McKay to International Joint Commission**

The White House announced on July 18 that President Eisenhower had appointed Douglas McKay to be a Commissioner on the part of the United States on the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, vice Len Jordan, resigning.

## **Aid to Refugees From Egypt**

Press release 429 dated July 19

The Department of State announced on July 19 that the sum of \$763,175 has just been made available from mutual security funds to assist in moving 17,100 Jewish, Italian, and Greek refugees who have left Egypt since November 1956 to permanent homes elsewhere, largely outside Europe. Many of these refugees are temporarily finding refuge in Greece, Italy, and France, intensifying the already heavy refugee problems of these countries. Some of them have gone to Israel.

Of the sum made available for their movement, \$563,175 will be contributed through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration

and \$200,000 through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The amount being provided ICEM represents 45 percent of the \$1,251,500 necessary to aid these refugees. Other governments are contributing the remainder.

## **Sultan of Morocco Accepts Invitation To Visit Washington**

white House press release dated July 18

*The White House on July 18 made public the following letter to the President from the Sultan of Morocco.*

JUNE 4, 1957

To HIS EXCELLENCY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

It was with great pleasure that we received your letter dated April 29.<sup>1</sup> We thank you for the sentiments of friendship and esteem for us that you expressed, and we are happy to learn that you were deeply moved by the spontaneous welcome extended to the Vice President of the United States in our country.

We also thank you most sincerely for the invitation that you have extended to us to visit Washington. We are happy to inform you that we have accepted your kind invitation and that we propose, by the grace of God, to make that visit on November 25.

We hope that our presence in the United States will afford us an opportunity to become acquainted with your great country and the noble American people, to proceed with you to exchanges of views concerning the present state of the relations between our two countries and pertinent problems, the solution of which is of interest to our two nations. We were particularly happy to learn of your desire to place our relations on a basis of equality between two independent and sovereign nations. We share with you that same desire, and we are fully confident that its realization will be the best guarantee of the maintenance of good relations between our two countries, in a climate of mutual respect and fruitful cooperation.

We are certain that the greatest good for our two countries will result from our conversations.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 1, 1957, p. 19.

Our relations in the past, auspiciously based on confidence and friendship, strengthen our conviction that, in the future, they will be characterized by closer and more fruitful cooperation.

Please accept our greetings and our deep esteem.

MOHAMMED BEN YOUSSEF

## U.S. Food To Supplement Diet of Tunisian Children

The International Cooperation Administration announced on July 9 that American foods soon will be going to Tunisia to help supplement the diet of almost 200,000 Tunisian children of school age. The foodstuffs, which are in surplus in this country, will be supplied to the Tunisian Government to improve and expand its school-lunch and other child-feeding programs.

The foods to be provided by the United States—dried milk, cheese, and flour—will be added to local fruits and vegetables supplied by the Tunisian Government. The American contribution also will enable Tunisia to provide midday meals for about 190,000 children in schools and institutions, more than doubling the current program, which serves some 90,000 children. There are about 227,000 children in the Tunisian schools.

A gift of the American people to the people of Tunisia, the food shipments were authorized in documents signed in Washington on July 9 by Ambassador Mongi Slim of Tunisia in the presence of D. A. FitzGerald, the International Cooperation Administration's Deputy Director for Operations.

The U.S. food contribution was requested last fall by Tunisian Prime Minister Bourguiba while on a visit to the United States. The Tunisian child-feeding program was studied in December by an ICA team which was surveying Tunisian economic problems in order to establish an economic and technical program for the newly independent nation. It was also studied by a specialist sent from Italy, where a similar joint child-feeding program has been conducted for the past 2 years.

The U.S. foodstuffs will be supplied for the school year beginning in September and ending in June 1958. Valued at \$1.8 million (Commodity Credit Corporation cost), they include some 875 metric tons of dried milk, 650 tons of cheese, and

3,315 tons of flour. Under the agreement, the U.S. Government will pay the ocean-freight costs of the shipments. The Tunisian Government will make the distribution of the food in Tunisia, providing storage, cooking, and other necessary facilities and equipment. The Tunisian people will be informed that the food sent from the United States is a gift of the American people. The donated foods do not displace normal sales of these commodities.

The U.S. commodities are provided under title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480). Title II, which is administered by ICA, authorizes grants to friendly nations of agricultural products held as surplus by the Commodity Credit Corporation.

## Quota on Rye Imports

White House press release dated June 27

### WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President has issued a proclamation imposing for 2 years an annual quota of 186 million pounds on imports of rye, rye meal, and rye flour. In accepting the finding of the U.S. Tariff Commission that import restrictions would remain necessary after June 30, 1957, in order to prevent material interference with the domestic price-support program for rye, the President ordered a 2-year extension of the present annual quota of 186 million pounds.

The Tariff Commission, in its report of June 18, 1957,<sup>1</sup> recommended an indefinite annual quota of 95.2 million pounds. The President, however, decided to continue for 2 years the present annual quota of 186 million pounds. This annual quota was established in 1954. Rye stocks have been reduced considerably since then, and prospective supplies are much closer to likely demand than in any of the intervening 3 years.

The proclamation continues the historical allocation of the quota: 182,280,000 pounds for imports from Canada, with the remainder for imports from all other countries. As at present, not more than 15,000 pounds of the total permissible imports may be of rye flour or rye meal.

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

Seed rye continues to be exempt from the quota under the qualifications prescribed in the proclamation.

The quota was first imposed on March 31, 1954.<sup>2</sup> It was extended on June 30, 1955, for the period ending June 30, 1957.<sup>3</sup> On May 11, 1957, the President requested the Tariff Commission to determine the necessity for continued restrictions.

The Tariff Commission's investigation and report were made pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, which authorizes limitations on imports when imports are interfering with or threaten to interfere with domestic price-support programs. The Tariff Commission found that continued restrictions on imports of rye were necessary to protect the Department of Agriculture's price-support program for rye.

#### PROCLAMATION 3189<sup>4</sup>

##### IMPOSING A QUOTA ON IMPORTS OF RYE, RYE FLOUR, AND RYE MEAL

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), the Secretary of Agriculture advised me that there was reason to believe that rye, rye flour, and rye meal are practically certain to be imported into the United States after June 30, 1957, under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price-support program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to rye pursuant to sections 301 and 401 of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, or to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic rye with respect to which such program of the Department of Agriculture is being undertaken; and

WHEREAS, on May 11, 1957, I caused the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation under the said section 22 with respect to this matter; and

WHEREAS the said Tariff Commission has made such investigation and has reported to me its findings and recommendations made in connection therewith; and

WHEREAS, on the basis of the said investigation and report of the Tariff Commission, I find that rye, rye flour, and rye meal, in the aggregate, are practically certain to be imported into the United States after June 30, 1957, under such conditions and in such quantities as to interfere materially with and to tend to render ineffective the said price-support program with respect to rye, and to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic rye with respect to which said price-support program is being undertaken; and

WHEREAS I find and declare that the imposition of the quantitative limitations hereinafter proclaimed is shown by such investigation of the Tariff Commission to be necessary in order that the entry, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption after June 30, 1957, of rye, rye flour, and rye meal will not render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the said price-support program:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim that

(1) the total aggregate quantity of rye, rye flour, and rye meal which may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in each of the 12-month periods beginning July 1 in 1957 and in 1958 shall not exceed 186,000,000 pounds, of which not more than 15,000 pounds may be in the form of rye flour or rye meal, which permissible total quantities I find and declare to be proportionately not less than 50 per centum of the total quantity of such rye, rye flour, and rye meal entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the representative period July 1, 1950, to June 30, 1953, inclusive, and

(2) during each such 12-month period, of the foregoing permissible total quantity, not more than 182,280,000 pounds shall be imported from Canada and not more than 3,720,000 pounds shall be imported from other foreign countries.

The provisions of this proclamation shall not apply to certified or registered seed rye for use in seeding and crop-improvement purposes, in bags tagged and sealed by an officially recognized seed-certifying agency of the country of production, if—

(a) the individual shipment amounts to 100 bushels (of 56 pounds each) or less, or

(b) the individual shipment amounts to more than 100 bushels (of 56 pounds each) and the written approval of the Secretary of Agriculture or his designated representative is presented at the time of entry, or bond is furnished in a form prescribed by the Commissioner of Customs in an amount equal to the value of the merchandise as set forth in the entry, plus the estimated duty as determined at the time of entry, conditioned upon the production of such written approval within six months from the date of entry.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 27th day of June  
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-  
[SEAL] seven, and of the Independence of the United  
States of America the one hundred and eighty-  
first.



By the President:  
JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
Secretary of State

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 12, 1954, p. 565.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, July 18, 1955, p. 117.

<sup>4</sup> 22 Fed. Reg. 4631.

## **President Asks for Investigation of Fig Imports**

White House press release dated July 18

The President on July 18 requested the United States Tariff Commission to make an immediate investigation of the effects of imports of dried figs and fig paste upon the programs or operations undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to dried figs and fig paste, including the Federal Fig Marketing Order, and upon the amount of products processed in the United States from domestically produced figs. The President's action was taken in response to a recommendation from the Secretary of Agriculture. The Commission's investigation will be made pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended.

### **President's Letter to Edgar B. Brossard, Chairman of Tariff Commission**

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture that there is reason

to believe that dried figs and fig paste are being or are practically certain to be imported under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective or materially interfere with the programs or operations undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to dried figs and fig paste, including the Federal Fig Marketing Order, or to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestically produced figs. A copy of the Secretary's letter is enclosed.<sup>1</sup>

The United States Tariff Commission is requested to make an immediate investigation under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, to determine the need for restricting imports of these articles.

The Commission's findings should be completed as soon as practicable.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## **Consideration of Mexican and North American Regional Broadcasting Agreements**

*Following is a statement by Livingston Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Transport and Communications, made on July 11 before the sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations considering the North Atlantic Regional Broadcasting Agreement (S. Exec. A, 82d Cong., 1st sess.) and the U.S.-Mexican Broadcasting Agreement (S. Exec. G, 85th Cong., 1st sess.). The statement is followed by a history submitted by Mr. Satterthwaite for the record of the hearings concerning previous broadcasting agreements and the negotiations leading to the proposed agreements.*

Press release 416 dated July 11

### **STATEMENT BY MR. SATTERTHWAITE**

The Department hopes very much that the committee will now be able to act favorably on the two standard-broadcasting-band agreements which have been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

I believe that most of the concern over the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA), expressed when the Foreign Relations Committee previously considered it, has now been satisfied by the proposed bilateral agreement with Mexico. You now have a complete package before you and are therefore in a better position to judge the agreements.

International agreement on the use of the standard broadcasting band (535 to 1605 kc.) is essential to the orderly and successful development of this broadcasting service in each country. Such agreement is of especial importance to the United States with its highly developed system of broadcasting. The standard broadcasting band is allocated a total of 1070 kc. by international agreement. In the North American region this is further divided into 107 channels. Accordingly all countries in the North American region must accommodate their standard-band (AM) broadcast on these 107 channels. The United States has

more than 3,100 of these broadcasting stations, nearly 4 times as many as there are in all the other North American countries put together. This, coupled with the central location of the United States in the North American region, makes an agreement in this field with the neighboring governments especially important to the protection of United States interests. Without such agreement each country would be free to utilize these radio channels as it pleased, and chaotic interference would be bound to result as a radio wave does not respect international boundaries.

#### **North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement**

I would like first to say a few words about the NARBA.<sup>1</sup> The NARBA sets up the norms by which the United States and the other signatory countries of the North American region can assign radio stations within their respective countries and be assured that such assignments will not cause interference to or receive interference from foreign broadcasting stations. Without such agreed-upon norms, which must of necessity be quite detailed, you cannot have that assurance. The NARBA is for a term of 5 years but also provides that, if a new agreement has not entered into force at the expiration of the 5-year period, it will remain in full force and effect until the date of entry into force of a new agreement. Thus the hiatus of having no agreement in force, as is the case now, is avoided.

The North American region consists of the Bahama Islands, Jamaica, Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, and the United States. All of these countries except Haiti and Mexico signed the proposed NARBA. Cuba and Canada have ratified. Mexico, which does not plan to adhere to the NARBA, has entered into the pending bilateral agreement with the U.S. Canada ratified with a reservation. This reservation is in regard to Canadian use of power greater than the maximum permitted under the NARBA on certain channels. This reservation creates no difficulties for the United States since it provides that stations on the same or adjacent channels will be protected from the increase in power of the Canadian stations. Moreover, Canadian officials discussed this matter informally with United

<sup>1</sup> For background on the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA), see BULLETIN of July 16, 1951, p. 113.

States officials prior to making the reservation and received assurance that it would not adversely affect U.S. interests. The Department has submitted the Canadian reservation to the Senate.<sup>2</sup>

The NARBA, in the opinion of the State Department, is in the overall interest of the United States listening public and the standard-band broadcasting industry of this country. It is fair to our neighboring countries and therefore will prevent serious problems in its application.

#### **Agreement With Mexico**

The agreement with Mexico was reached following a series of negotiations which began in 1950. The July 1955 United States/Mexican Broadcasting Conference resulted in a considerable area of informal agreement, and agreement was finally reached at subsequent conversations between Commissioner Rosel H. Hyde of the Federal Communications Commission and Mexican telecommunication officials at Mexico City, October 16-29, 1956. The agreement was signed at Mexico City on January 29, 1957.<sup>3</sup>

This agreement has the same general purpose as the NARBA. Its main features are:

1. The agreement will supersede all previous agreements and will govern the relationship between the United States and Mexico in the use of the standard broadcasting band. It will remain in effect for a period of 5 years unless terminated by either government or replaced by a new agreement.

2. Under the agreement each country retains the same number of class 1-A (clear) channels as provided in the 1937 NARBA, with the nighttime secondary use (as specified in the agreement) by each country of a few of the other's clear channels. In addition, the United States has agreed to give class 1-A protection to Mexico on 540 kilocycles.

3. Each of the countries can increase the daytime power of its secondary stations on certain clear channels of the other.

4. At specified distances from the border the maximum power of local stations can be increased from 250 to 500 watts at night and to 1 kilowatt during the daytime. In addition, at specified distances from the border the maximum power

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1957, p. 288.

of stations on regional channels can be increased from 5 to 25 kilowatts.

5. Many outstanding objections of long standing regarding proposed station assignments of both countries have been resolved.

#### **Need for Standard-Band Broadcasting Agreements**

The Department, with the FCC, has worked hard to secure these two agreements because we are well aware of the tremendous stake of the United States in standard-band broadcasting, of the important investments of time and money which have gone into it in this country, of its far-reaching effects as an information medium and as a medium of advertising United States products and enterprises. The Department is also well aware of the serious repercussions which would result if the interests of the listening public in this country were to be the subject of material interference, and of the friction that can develop in our relations with the other countries of the region if there is not mutually satisfactory use of the standard broadcasting band.

Neither the FCC nor the State Department will claim that these agreements fully meet the desires of every standard-band broadcasting station in the United States. We do believe that the stability and the protection from future interference that will result will be of benefit to all and that the agreements are the very best that can be negotiated. The negotiation of agreements in this field is not a simple matter. The standard broadcast band is limited. Each country wants more of it than can be arranged. The result is, of necessity, a compromise.

Throughout the protracted negotiations for the NARBA and the Mexican agreement, the State Department and the FCC have worked together very closely. The United States broadcasting industry has been fully consulted and many representatives of the industry have participated in the negotiations as advisers to the United States delegation. We believe that the agreements have widespread support in the industry.

I urge the committee to keep in mind the fact that without such an agreement there is no assurance that any channel can be free of interference from a foreign station. Without the legal basis provided by the agreements there are no agreed-upon norms for making station assignments or evaluating interference. Thus, in the absence of

agreement, if interference does occur from foreign stations, it will be difficult, and may be impossible, for the Department of State to protect United States broadcasting. We trust this committee will find, on full review of the facts, that these proposed treaties are in the best interests of the United States; that they adequately protect the listening public and do so with a minimum of change for the broadcasting industry of this country.

I have prepared for the record of the hearings a brief history of the previous agreements in the North American region and of the negotiating history of the proposed NARBA and the Mexican agreement, which I would like to submit at this time.

This concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for the privilege of appearing. Commissioner Hyde is prepared to present the details of these agreements and to give you whatever technical information you desire. If there are any nontechnical questions you care to ask, I shall try to answer them.

#### **HISTORY OF PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS ON PROPOSED AGREEMENTS**

The first such treaty in the North American Region was known as the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA) which was signed at Habana December 13, 1937 (55 Stat., pt. 2, 1005). The North American Region consists of the Bahama Islands and Jamaica, Canada, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, and the United States. However, this first agreement did not go into effect until March 29, 1941, due to the reluctance of Mexico to ratify it. Mexican ratification was not forthcoming until the United States concluded a supplemental bilateral agreement with Mexico whereby the United States agreed to protect Mexican class 1-A (clear) channels having frequencies of 730, 800, 900 and 1570 kc., and also agreed to give certain protection to Mexican operations on Mexican class 1-A (clear) channels 1050 and 1220 kc. Except for two full-time U.S. assignments (one on 1050 and one on 1220 kc.) the United States agreed to limit United States stations on these six Mexican class 1-A channels to daytime-only operation with a maximum of 1 kw. power. This is more protection than the United States gives the class 1-A channels of any of the other NARBA signatories. This supplemental agreement was an executive agreement effected by exchange of notes signed August 24 and 28, 1940, and is commonly known as the "gentlemen's agreement." The gentlemen's agreement became effective at the same time as the first NARBA, i. e., March 29, 1941, but it has no terminal date. In other words, its termination was not dependent upon the duration of the NARBA.

Accordingly, even though the NARBA has expired by its terms, the gentlemen's agreement has been construed by the Department of State as still in force.

The original NARBA was for a term of 5 years but the operation of the provisions contained therein (with certain modifications) was extended for an additional 3 years by an interim agreement (*modus vivendi*) signed at Washington, D. C., February 25, 1948 (60 Stat. 1862). This agreement has also expired by its terms.

A new multilateral agreement was signed at Washington, D. C., November 15, 1950, and is now before the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification (Executive A, 82d Congress, 1st session). The agreement is for a term of 5 years but also provides that if a new agreement has not entered into force at the expiration of the 5-year period, this agreement shall remain in full force and effect until the date of entry into force of a new agreement. Thus the hiatus of having no agreement in force, as is the case now, is avoided.

The series of negotiations pursuant to the new NARBA were as follows:

a. Meeting of Technicians at Habana, Cuba, November 1-December 6, 1947.<sup>4</sup>

b. Trip of Ambassador Albert F. Nufer (State) and Commissioner George E. Sterling (FCC) to Habana, Cuba, September 8-9-10, 1949, to discuss forthcoming NARBA Conference with Cuban Minister of State and other Cuban officials.

c. First session of the third NARBA Conference, Montreal, Canada, September 13-December 8, 1949 (recessed without reaching agreement due to differences between the United States and Cuba over station assignments).

d. U.S. Delegation spent February 1-March 24, 1950, in Habana in a further unsuccessful effort to reconcile US/Cuban differences.

e. Second session of the NARBA Conference, Washington, D. C., September 6-November 15, 1950 (agreement reached and signed on November 15, 1950, by all parties except Mexico and Haiti).

f. A subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the chairmanship of the late Senator Tobey, held hearings on NARBA, July 8-9-10, 1953.

The series of negotiations pursuant to the U.S.-Mexican Broadcasting Agreements were as follows:

(1) Second session NARBA Conference, Washington, D.C., September 6-November 15, 1950 (On October 18, 1950, Mexico withdrew from the Conference, prior to its conclusion and without reaching any agreement).

(2) Conference at Mexico City, February 2-9, 1952.

(3) Conference at Washington, D.C., March 29-April 2, 1954.

(4) Conference at Mexico City, November 4-December 17, 1954.

(5) Conference at Washington, D.C., July 7-28, 1955.

(6) Negotiations by Commissioner Hyde at Mexico City, October 16-29, 1956.

(7) Agreement signed at Mexico City, January 29, 1957.

<sup>4</sup> For an article on the meeting, see *ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1948, p. 541.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 85th Congress, 1st Session

Surplus Commodities Disposal (Public Law 480, 83d Cong.). Hearing before the House Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 1905, H. R. 1906, H. R. 4103, and H. R. 5534. Serial K. March 29, 1957. 78 pp.

To Protect Rights of United States Vessels on High Seas. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H. R. 5526, a bill to amend the act of August 27, 1954 (68 Stat. 883), relating to the rights of vessels of the United States on the high seas and in the territorial waters of foreign countries. April 17, 1957. 77 pp.

Building a World of Free Peoples. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs at St. Louis, Mo., April 27, 1957, 118 pp.; at Kansas City, Mo., April 29, 1957, 86 pp.; at Miami, Fla., May 4, 1957, 119 pp.

Report on the Operations of the Department of State (under Public Law 584). Letter from the Secretary of State transmitting a report on the international educational exchange program carried out by the Department, pursuant to Public Law 584, 79th Cong. H. Doc. 164, April 29, 1957. 116 pp.

Land Transfer Under Panama Treaty. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Panama Canal of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H. R. 6709, a bill to implement a treaty and agreement with the Republic of Panama, and for other purposes. May 2, 1957. 86 pp.

Food Disposal Abroad by Voluntary Agencies. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Consumers Study of the House Committee on Agriculture. Part 2, May 9 and 15, 1957. Serial U. 101 pp.

Return of American Prisoners of War Who Have Not Been Accounted for by the Communists. Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. Con. Res. 140 and similar measures. May 27, 1957. 63 pp.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Attitudes of Soviet Leaders Toward Disarmament. Replies from experts on the Soviet Union to subcommittee questionnaire. Staff Study No. 8. Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. June 6, 1957. 106 pp. [Committee print.]

St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 1174, a bill to clarify the general powers and increase the borrowing authority and authorize the development of interest payments on borrowing of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. June 19, 1957. 56 pp.

Implementing 1955 Treaty and Agreement With the Republic of Panama. Report to accompany S. 1730. S. Rept. 479, June 21, 1957. 6 pp.

Transmission of Executive Agreements to the Senate. Report to accompany S. 603. S. Rept. 521, June 25, 1957. 3 pp.

Favoring Further Consideration by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the Problem of Hungary. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 35. S. Rept. 523, June 25, 1957. 15 pp.

St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. Report to accompany S. 1174. S. Rept. 525, June 25, 1957. 8 pp.

The Austrian Bonds Agreement. Report to accompany Exec. H, 85th Cong., 1st sess. S. Exec. Rept. 4, June 25, 1957. 4 pp.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### **Calendar of Meetings<sup>1</sup>**

#### **Adjourned During July 1957**

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 20th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 20-July 12
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Committee on Administrative Unions . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 20-July 12
WMO Commission for Aerology: 2d Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 18-July 9
WMO Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observation: 2d Session.	Paris . . . . .	June 18-July 9
7th Berlin International Film Festival . . . . .	Berlin . . . . .	June 21-July 2
International Rubber Study Group: 13th Meeting . . . . .	Jogjakarta . . . . .	June 24-July 1
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 25-July 31*
International Sugar Council: 13th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 2 (1 day)
Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses: Annual Meeting.	London . . . . .	July 8 (1 day)
PIANC: 19th International Congress . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 8-July 16
UNESCO/IBE: 20th International Conference on Public Education.	Geneva . . . . .	July 8-July 17
Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Working Group on Asian Regional Nuclear Center.	Washington . . . . .	July 8-July 19
International Union of Crystallography: 4th General Assembly and International Congress.	Montreal . . . . .	July 10-July 17
U.N. Refugee Fund: 6th (Special) Session of the Executive Committee.	Geneva . . . . .	July 11 (1 day)
GATT Intersessional Committee: Working Party on Balance-of-Payment Matters.	Paris . . . . .	July 16-July 17
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry: 19th Conference.	Paris . . . . .	July 16-July 25

#### **In Session as of July 31, 1957**

U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee on Disarmament . . . . .	London . . . . .	Mar. 18-
ILO "Art and Labor" Exposition . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 15-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 24th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 2-
Latin American Seminar on Social Welfare Training . . . . .	Montevideo . . . . .	July 20-
U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 8th Session.	New York . . . . .	July 22-
Caribbean Commission: Conference on Demographic Problems of the Caribbean Area.	Trinidad . . . . .	July 25-
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Semiannual Meeting of Directing Council.	Lima . . . . .	July 29-
Pan American Highway Congress: Inter-American Meeting of Traffic Experts.	Panama City . . . . .	July 29-

#### **Scheduled August 1-October 31, 1957**

6th Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations Interested in Migration.	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Assessment of Hydroelectric Potential.	Bangkok . . . . .	Aug. 5-
International Statistical Institute: 30th Session . . . . .	Stockholm . . . . .	Aug. 8-
Universal Postal Union: 14th Congress . . . . .	Ottawa . . . . .	Aug. 14-
Organization of American States: Economic Conference . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	Aug. 15-
Edinburgh Film Festival . . . . .	Edinburgh . . . . .	Aug. 18-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Inland Ports.	Bangkok . . . . .	Aug. 19-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 18, 1957. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and places. Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; PIANC, Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; IBE, International Bureau of Education; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ILO, International Labor Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe.

## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

### Scheduled August 1–October 31, 1957—Continued

International Scientific Radio Union: 12th General Assembly . . . . .	Boulder, Colo. . . . .	Aug. 22-
18th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art . . . . .	Venice . . . . .	Aug. 25-
7th British Commonwealth Forestry Conference . . . . .	Australia and New Zealand . . . . .	Aug. 26-
ICAO Teletypewriter Technical Panel: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Aug. 26-
9th International Congress on Cell Biology . . . . .	St. Andrews, Scotland . . . . .	Aug. 28-
International Geographical Union: Regional Conference . . . . .	Nara and Kyoto . . . . .	Aug. 29-
International Union of Public Transportation: 33d Congress . . . . .	Hamburg and Berlin . . . . .	Aug. 29-
9th Pan American Railway Congress . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	Aug. 30-
International Exposition of the Sea . . . . .	Marseille . . . . .	Sept. 1-
International Association on Quaternary Research: 5th International Congress.	Barcelona and Madrid . . . . .	Sept. 2-
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics: 11th General Assembly.	Toronto . . . . .	Sept. 3-
U.N. ECAFE Workshop on Problems of Budget Reclassification: 2d Meeting.	Bangkok . . . . .	Sept. 3-
WHO Regional Committee for Western Pacific: 8th Session . . . . .	Hong Kong . . . . .	Sept. 5-
UNESCO International Conference on Radioisotopes . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Sept. 9-
ICAO Communications Division: 6th Session . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Sept. 10-
ICAO Legal Committee: Special Subcommittee on Rule 57 of Standing Rules of Procedure.	Tokyo . . . . .	Sept. 10-
PASO Executive Committee: 32d and 33d Meetings . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 10-
ICAO Legal Committee: 11th Session . . . . .	Tokyo . . . . .	Sept. 12-
Interparliamentary Union: 46th Conference . . . . .	London . . . . .	Sept. 12-
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Executive Committee . . . . .	Ibadan, Nigeria . . . . .	Sept. 16-
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Statistical Subcommittee . . . . .	Ibadan, Nigeria . . . . .	Sept. 16-
PASO Directing Council: 10th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 16-
WHO Regional Committee for the Americas: 9th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 16-
U.N. ECAFE/FAO Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 3d Meeting.	Bangkok . . . . .	Sept. 16-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 2d Meeting of Cocoa Study Group.	Ibadan, Nigeria . . . . .	Sept. 17-
International Union of Pure and Applied Physics: 9th General Assembly.	Rome . . . . .	Sept. 17-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Monetary Fund: 12th Annual Meeting of Boards of Governors.	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 23-
4th FAO/WHO Conference on Nutrition Problems in Latin America.	Guatemala City . . . . .	Sept. 23-
FAO International Rice Commission: 7th Meeting of Working Party on Rice Breeding; Working Party on Fertilizers.	Vercelli, Italy . . . . .	Sept. 23-
IA-ECOSOC: Meeting of Experts on Technical Standards . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	Sept. 23-
17th International Conference of Sociology . . . . .	Beirut . . . . .	Sept. 23-
WMO Executive Committee: 9th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24-
ICEM Executive Committee: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 26*
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Experts To Study Certain Technical Railway Questions.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 30-
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	Sept. 30-
9th Meeting of Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Preliminary Working Group.	Saigon . . . . .	Sept. 30-
FAO Plant Protection Committee for Southeast Asia and Pacific Region.	Ceylon* . . . . .	September
FAO European Contact Group on Uses of Isotopes and Radiation in Agriculture Research.	Bonn . . . . .	September
FAO International Chestnut Commission . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	September
GATT Balance-of-Payments Consultations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	September
U.N. Advisory Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: 7th Session.	New York . . . . .	September
International Atomic Energy Agency: 1st General Conference and 1st Meeting of Board of Governors.	Vienna . . . . .	Oct. 1-
9th Meeting of Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Officials Meeting.	Saigon . . . . .	Oct. 7-
ICAO Preparatory Meeting on Air Traffic Control Problems in the European-Mediterranean Region.	Lisbon* . . . . .	Oct. 7-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 2d Session . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Oct. 7-
FAO International Fishing Gear Congress . . . . .	Hamburg . . . . .	Oct. 7-
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 6th Session . . . . .	Monterrey . . . . .	Oct. 7-
ICEM Council: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7*
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 15th Session (and Subsidiary Bodies).	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 10-
FAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Fertilizers.	Italy . . . . .	Oct. 14-
FAO Study Group on Grains: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 14-
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 1st Session of Working Group on Telecommunications.	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 14-
South Pacific Commission: 17th Session . . . . .	Nouméa, New Caledonia . . . . .	Oct. 14-

## **Calendar of Meetings—Continued**

### **Scheduled August 1–October 31, 1957—Continued**

U.N. ECE/FAO Timber Committee: 15th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 14-
U.N. ECAFE Highway Subcommittee: 4th Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 14-
GATT Contracting Parties: 12th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 17-
9th Meeting of Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Ministerial Meeting.	Saigon . . . . .	Oct. 21-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 29th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 21-
U.N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade and East-West Trade Consultations.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 21-
ILO Governing Body: 137th Session (and Committees) . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Oct. 22-
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 1st Meeting . . . . .	New Delhi . . . . .	Oct. 24-
19th International Red Cross Conference . . . . .	Malang, Indonesia . . . . .	Oct. 24-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 4th Session of Inland Waterways Subcommittee.	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 24-
FAO Committee on Relations With International Organizations . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 28-
FAO Council: 27th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	October
WMO Commission for Bibliography and Publications: 2d Session . . . . .		

## **The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands**

*Statement by Delmas H. Nucker  
U.S. Special Representative in the Trusteeship Council<sup>1</sup>*

It is a privilege to appear before you as Special Representative of the Trust Territory of the Pacific to report on the significant events that have occurred in the progress of our administration since July 1, 1956. This is the third time I have had the honor and pleasure of serving in this capacity, and I look forward, as I have in the past, to receiving the benefits of the views and recommendations of the members of the Council.

My report this year has an added significance. This July 1957 marks the completion of 10 years of administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands under the auspices of the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement and thus affords me the opportunity to report briefly on the progress that has been made in this formative period of our administration.

Ten years ago, the area we call the Trust Territory of the Pacific had but recently emerged

from the devastation and ravages of war. Although the area had been secured in 1945, it was a slow and hard struggle to repair the damages wrought by the war. The local economy, which had rested largely on copra, had been destroyed, the transportation system was almost nonexistent, schooling had all but disappeared. In almost all areas of activity a fresh start had to be made.

To rebuild the shattered economy was not an easy task. The difficulties of reclamation, then as well as now, went hand in hand with a geographical handicap perhaps unparalleled elsewhere in the world—that of a small population scattered on tiny islets spread over a segment of ocean surface as vast as the United States of America or the continent of Australia.

The progress achieved by the people of Micronesia in the past 10 years takes on added significance in view of the handicaps faced.

### **Administration**

Among the most important events of general administrative significance this past year was the

<sup>1</sup>Made in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on May 28 (U.S./U.N. press release 2680). Mr. Nucker is High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. For a review of the previous year by Mr. Nucker, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1956, p. 35.

completion of the conversion program of our American employees to the competitive civil service. Except for a small number of employees who hold temporary jobs, such as those associated with our special construction projects, our American employees now enjoy the advantages of permanent civil service status.

A minor administrative change came about by the upgrading of our personnel and supply sections to the status of separate departments. Headquarters staff was augmented during the year by appointment of a new deputy high commissioner, an internal auditor, and a general assistant to the chief counsel. Two new positions of considerable significance, that of a training supervisor and a full-time counselor for our Micronesian students in Hawaii, were added to our staff as part of our program of training Micronesians for responsible jobs in the administration of their area.

Our permanent Micronesian personnel increased somewhat during the year, from 1,437 to 1,539, the increase being brought about by sizable additions to our agriculture, education, and public-health departments. In addition, 318 Micronesians were employed in our special construction program.

During the year two top administrative positions formerly filled by American staff members were taken over by Micronesians: these were the finance officer position in Palau district, and the land title officer in Ponape district. A minor milestone also was reached in Palau, where for the first time a senior secretarial position was filled with a qualified Micronesian clerk-typist. Within the next few months it is anticipated that the position of finance officer in Truk district will also be filled by a qualified Trukese applicant.

#### Economic Advancement

In the field of economic advancement we have continued to encourage the Micronesians to develop their natural resources within the limits of their own capabilities. We are giving encouragement by way of technical aid and advice, by providing substantial financial assistance to local concerns, and by sending qualified Micronesians abroad to acquire "know-how" in the fields where economic development appears promising.

We have loaned close to \$400,000 to Micronesian-owned trading companies under a development loan program and shall continue this process within our financial capabilities and the needs of

the Micronesian companies. At the present time, some \$275,000 is invested in such development loans.

During the past year two additional trading companies were chartered by the administration, making a total of nine such limited stock trading companies now in existence throughout the territory. It is significant that these two new companies came into being in districts where there is stiff competition from large and well-established companies. This type of competition is to us a healthy sign, since by its existence prices of consumer goods will be kept at a reasonable level for the local population.

Copra remains the backbone of the economy of Micronesia and the major source of income for most of our Micronesians. The war completely shattered the copra industry throughout Micronesia, and in 1946, after the area had been secured, only a few hundred tons of copra were exported. By 1948 copra exports had risen to 8,000 tons annually, yielding about \$700,000 in revenue. In 1956, 12,300 tons of copra were exported at a value in round figures of \$1,250,000. This year we expect to export an estimated 13,300 tons with a revenue return of \$1,400,000. The quality of our copra has continued to improve; 82 percent of all copra sold this past fiscal year was grade one, 14 percent grade two, and only 4 percent was grade three. Through our coconut technical expert, a training program in better methods of processing copra was launched, and we anticipate that an even higher proportion of grade-one copra should result in the future. By the institution of more regular field-trip service, a better quality of copra also is resulting since deterioration due to inadequate storage is being prevented.

In spite of the fluctuating world market for copra, we were able through the Copra Stabilization Fund to maintain a constant price of \$110 a ton to the producer for grade-one copra during the year. This necessitated using only about \$30,000 from the copra fund, and at the end of last month a balance of \$890,000 was in the fund. During the year we also instituted a program of regular and widespread reporting on the operation of the Copra Stabilization Fund in line with a recommendation made by the 1956 United Nations Visiting Mission. At regular intervals financial statements of the fund, as well as simple explan-

atory reports on what the fund is and how it operates, are released. These are translated into the various vernaculars and are given wide distribution. The public reaction to this regular reporting has been intense since it allows the small copra producer to anticipate his potential income at the time of harvest and enables him to plan for his family needs more systematically.

Trochus production during fiscal year 1956 rose to over 400 tons, producing an income of roughly \$350,000. While the tonnage of trochus shell harvested during the 1957 season dropped to approximately 350 tons, the season proved to be the most profitable one for the people of Micronesia. A top price of \$1,160 a short ton brought in a revenue of over \$388,000, or \$38,000 more than last year. The 1956 trochus season revealed that there was need for changes in the conservation program in some of the districts, and accordingly the Trust Territory Code is being amended to allow each district to establish its own conservation program.

During the past fiscal year handicraft income dropped somewhat. Uncertainty of supply and inadequate marketing have kept income from this source down. Currently one of the largest trading companies is planning to open a Micronesian handicraft store in Guam as an outlet for handicraft from all over the territory, and handicraft income is expected to increase with this new outlet.

An appreciable increase in the production of vegetable produce in Rota and Saipan districts came about during the past fiscal year. Income from this source rose to \$95,000 in 1956, an increase of about \$17,000 from the previous season. The forthcoming year should see an additional increase as the result of improved commercial shipping service by a Saipanese-owned shipping company. This regular service, plus better marketing arrangements, should stimulate the fresh-vegetable produce business for the people of Saipan, Tinian, and Rota.

#### Agriculture

We have continued to strengthen our agricultural programs since agriculture is the chief economic activity of our people. In the last 2 years our American agricultural staff has been more than doubled, and specialists in the fields of coconut development and marine biology have been employed. After a long search we have been able

to recruit a much-needed specialist in plant diseases and now have a plant pathologist on the staff. Our training program for Micronesian agricultural assistants has been stepped up. We now have 178 Micronesians employed in this field, an increase of 25 over last year.

Two Micronesian students now are working for agricultural degrees at the College of Agriculture at the University of the Philippines, and several of our students in Hawaii are specializing in agricultural courses.

As part of our long-range program to introduce new cash crops, three members of the agriculture department, an American and two Micronesians, spent part of this year studying cocoa planting, harvesting, and processing methods in Costa Rica.

Our staff fisheries biologist continued to concentrate on the supervising of the trochus harvesting program. Experimental work in trochus planting started, and better plans developed for the conservation of this valuable shell resource. The staff fisheries biologist also gave attention to the planning of a subsistence fisheries program for the territory. As a first step in the establishment of this interdistrict program in subsistence fishing, three young Micronesians, one from Palau, one from Ponape, and one from Saipan, participated in a special 3-month fisheries training course at Noumea, New Caledonia, under the auspices of the South Pacific Commission. Two of these trainees will be sent this June to Honolulu, where for several months they will get additional training and experience as trainees assigned to one of the fishing boats of the Pacific Ocean Fisheries Investigations, an adjunct of the Fish and Wildlife Service of the U.S. Department of the Interior. Upon completion of this training, we plan to use these two Micronesians as the nucleus of an interdistrict subsistence fishing demonstration team. We are currently recruiting a qualified American fisheries staff man to head this team. Through the development of a program of subsistence fishing we hope to enable the Micronesians to better utilize the valuable resources of the sea.

The improvement of subsistence crops has been accelerated. Each district center has a functioning agricultural station, field nurseries, and an extension service in operation. Our animal improvement program has as its goal the improvement of the quality of the present Micronesian

animal strain. Purebred swine from Hawaii were introduced into each district this past year as breeding stock. In the higher islands where pasture is available, cattle breeding for improvement of stock and production of meat is being stressed.

The work of the staff coconut expert has been concentrated on a coconut rehabilitation and replanting program and a demonstration program for better copra processing. Mother palms have been selected and coconut nurseries established in all districts. Supervised coconut plantings also have been started in each district and special demonstration plantings started in areas that need intensive coconut rehabilitation work.

The cocoa plantation in Palau, the coconut plantation in Metalanim in Ponape, the experimental atoll research station in Jaluit in the Marshalls have expanded and increased their programs.

Work continues in the battle against insect pests and diseases that attack the food and money crops of the area. The first assignment of our new plant pathologist will be to investigate taro and breadfruit diseases in the Palau and Marshall districts. The fight against the rhinoceros beetle goes on in Palau. The agriculture department has intensified a cleanup program, and our entomologist continued experimental work with the predatory scolia wasp. The scolia wasp now appears to have successfully weathered its first stage, and in the past year we have been able to introduce the wasp in the larval stage to areas where coconut trees are still being damaged and killed by the coconut rhinoceros beetle. Although elimination of the rhinoceros beetle has not yet been achieved, we have now progressed in its control and extermination to the point where large areas, formerly pest ridden, have been effectively cleared. A large-scale program of replanting of coconut trees in such pest-free areas is under way.

Our agricultural program this year has been one of consolidation and of slow but forward expansion in extension and experimental agricultural work.

#### **Claim Settlement**

At long last we are able to report that appreciable progress was made in the settling of claims, particularly land claims in the territory.

All outstanding land claims in the Truk district were settled during May and June of last year.

A property claim by a Belgian family in the territory was brought successfully to conclusion, and a mutually satisfactory settlement both to the administration and claimants resulted.

It is with great satisfaction that we can state that the settlement to the people of Bikini and Eniwetok has taken place, both to their complete satisfaction and ours. The people of Kili accepted the sum of \$325,000 and the use rights to the island of Kili and three islets in the Jaluit atoll and gave in return the indefinite use rights of the atoll of Bikini to the Trust Territory government. At the request of the Kili people, made through their elected council, a trust fund of \$300,000 was established in their name. The annual income of this trust fund will be equal to their present copra income so that the Kilians, from henceforth, can look forward to at least a doubling of their present yearly income. The first installment of the interest from their trust fund will be ready for payment in July of this year.

The people of Eniwetok, now resident on Ujelang atoll, accepted in exchange for the indefinite use rights of Eniwetok the sum of \$175,000 and the use rights to the atoll of Ujelang. Again, as in Kili, the people, through their council, requested that \$150,000 of their money be placed in a trust fund. The first installment of interest on this fund will be paid to the people of Ujelang this July.

Work leading toward the settlement of remaining outstanding land claims continues. We expect to settle all remaining land claims which resulted from World War II in the Palau and Yap districts this calendar year. In the Marshalls sizable claims of this nature still remain to be settled. Certain of these at the present time are being negotiated; others still need additional cadastral surveying to determine settlement. We are now in the process of carrying out such necessary surveying.

At last year's session I reported that it was my earnest hope to be able to settle during this year the Japanese bond and postal savings claims. Administrative difficulties appeared that did not make this achievement possible. We have now set aside money for the settlement of these claims, and plans are under way to effect its use to wipe out

this small but important type of claim. When this is done, a source of irritation will have been removed from the minds of the Micronesians.

With the settlement of the land claims in Truk, the Etscheit claims in Truk and Ponape, the settlement of the Bikini and Eniwetok land claims, most of the major land claims have been met. We shall continue to exert every effort to settle all remaining land claims in the near future.

We have made progress also in releasing land to Micronesians. During the year the administration received title to the island of Ulul from a Belgian claimant, and plans are now under way to give the Trukese residents of the island title, through our homestead program, to the land on which they live. The island of Imiej in the Jaluit atoll, which had become public property, was homesteaded to its former owners. In Palau over 1,300 acres of public land on the island of Babelthuap was deeded to one of the municipalities for its use. As mentioned above, the use rights to the island of Kili, the islets of Jebet, Jar, Boklaplap, and to Ujelang atoll were transferred from the government to Micronesians during the year.

#### **Displaced Marshallese**

A most important event shortly is to take place within the territory—that of the return of the Rongelapese to their home atoll of Rongelap. This is an event long looked forward to by the people of Rongelap and equally so by the administration. Rongelap atoll has been determined to be safe for habitation. This month a new and complete village is being constructed on Rongelap; houses, a school, a church, a community building, a dispensary, canoe sheds, and cisterns are being built. Adequate financial resources have been set aside so that a gradual readjustment to their previous subsistence pattern of life will come about without any hardship to the Rongelapese people after their return to Rongelap. A voice-radio station will be established to permit ready contact with our Marshalls district radio network.

The periodic annual medical reexamination of the Rongelapese and Utirikese carried out only 2 months ago demonstrated that they are in fine health and that no lasting effects of the radioactive fallout can be perceived. In addition to the overall medical check on the entire group, five representatives recently volunteered to undergo special refined testing at the Argonne National Laboratory

near Chicago. These special tests supported the general examination results that the people had recovered fully and were in excellent health.

We have continued to give special aid to the economic, agricultural, social, and political problems of the people of Kili and Ujelang through our special Kili and Ujelang projects. The former isolation of Kili effectively has been broken by the operation of the Kili boat, the *Libra*, during the past year. This 50-foot auxiliary schooner has accelerated the economic and social progress of the Kilans. Copra production has increased, the Jabor facilities on Jaluit are being utilized, and the islets of Jebet, Jar, and Boklaplap are being cultivated. A truly integrated community is emerging on the island of Kili.

The people of Ujelang also have made an excellent adjustment to their new home. The outstanding success of the Marshallese project manager at Kili led this past year to the establishment of a similar post at Ujelang. Introduction of new food crops, the establishment of a coconut nursery, and the upgrading of local animal stock were among the main activities of the Ujelang project manager during the year. The Marshallese agriculturists of Kili and Ujelang participated in the recent agricultural conference at Guam, and I have been advised that their reports on their respective projects were among the outstanding features of this conference.

Better logistic support for Ujelang was achieved during the year through a more frequent field-trip schedule. Field-trip ships now regularly call at Ujelang once every 3 months. This coming year the installation of a voice-radio link is planned so that emergency communication with the district center at Majuro or Ebeye will be possible.

#### **Education**

One of the most outstanding developments in the past 10 years in the territory has been the growing consciousness on the part of Micronesians as to what public education is about and their acceptance of responsibility in supporting such a program. While the Japanese had instituted a limited public school system for island children, the war completely disrupted this school system and few of the children of school age in 1944 had had the opportunity of attending school for any appreciable length of time.

The first school in Micronesia was reopened in

the Marshalls in 1944. Today 197 separate schools are operating in the Trust Territory, comprised of 158 public elementary schools, 20 nonpublic elementary schools, 7 public secondary schools, and 12 nonpublic secondary schools. Last year there were 7,952 children enrolled in the public elementary schools, 1,433 in the nonpublic elementary schools, 820 in the public secondary schools, 495 in the nonpublic secondary schools, and 135 in Pacific Islands Central School, our highest public secondary school, making a total of 10,835 students attending schools in the Trust Territory. Preliminary estimates for the past year indicate that the student enrollment has climbed to over 11,000 students this year.

Increasingly, Micronesians are taking over both the administration and the management of education. One Micronesian is district director of education, and five intermediate schools now have Micronesian principals. Each of the main districts have Micronesian superintendents of schools. In the five districts which still have American directors of education, the role of these Americans largely has become that of advisers to the local school boards and the Micronesian superintendents and principals of the schools.

With the exception of the P.I.C.S. staff we have continued to use our American teaching staff as teacher trainers. Each of our main districts has two or more teacher trainers who devote full time to teacher aid and training. It is our aim that at least one of these teacher trainers devotes the major portion of his time to the improvement of education in the schools away from the district center or on the remote off-islands.

Local community support of education has climbed steadily in the past year. In three districts now the district legislative body has undertaken to pass legislation setting minimum salary standards for elementary-school teachers and centralizing payment of all elementary-school salaries. Every district now possesses functioning school boards which are playing active roles in determining educational policy for their respective communities.

New elementary-school buildings have been constructed. Some of these have been completely supported by the local community itself, others have been built through our grant-in-aid project. It can be reported in all sincerity that this administration's oft-stated policy of turning over the

main responsibility for elementary education to the local community is producing notable results. I will grant that elementary schools on our remote off-islands sometimes fall short of the goal we desire. By and large, the community-sponsored schools that have developed elsewhere reflect a degree of interest and participation in education that is true and strong for the reason that the community itself has underwritten the school, its teachers, and its program.

Through our program of teacher training, the providing of more and better textbooks in the vernacular, the support of new school construction through our grant-in-aid program, the administration shall continue to give every aid and encouragement to this truly "grass roots" system of elementary-school education.

This past year has seen the planning of an additional public intermediate school. By next June Kusaie island of Ponape district will have a complete public intermediate school, the first such intermediate school to be established outside the district center. We are supplying the materials for construction, the teaching staff, both American and Micronesian, and the upkeep of the school. The Kusaiens for their part are supplying the land, part of the materials, and all of the labor. Through joint enterprise the seventh public intermediate school in the territory will come into existence this coming year.

In 1956 the Pacific Islands Central School completed its first year as a full-fledged 3-year secondary school. A completely revised curriculum more responsive to the needs and interest of Micronesian youth was instituted.

Building plans for the new P.I.C.S. plant on a large site in Ponape were prepared during the year and preliminary work started. The building site area was cleared, roads put in, water lines laid. Preliminary estimates are that at least three major buildings will be ready for occupancy by the fall of 1958 although it now appears that it will be 1959 before the new plant will be completely finished. When this new plant is opened, it will afford opportunities also for a more practical curriculum, especially in the fields of agriculture and technical training, as well as allowing us to increase measurably the overall student enrollment.

An ever-increasing number of students are going outside the Trust Territory for higher educa-

tion. Ten years ago only a handful of students had managed to go outside the territory for schooling. In 1956, 225 students were studying outside the territory. While the majority, 157, were attending secondary schools in Guam, 37 were studying in Hawaii, 16 in the Philippines, 11 in the United States, and 2 in Suva. This number appreciably increased this current year. Six years ago, other than the medical and dental students at Suva, Fiji, only one Trust Territory scholarship was granted for higher education. Last year 15 Trust Territory scholarships were granted. This forthcoming year we anticipate the starting of an additional scholarship program designed to give full degree university training to a select group of outstanding students.

In all districts the education department and health department have joined forces in developing a broad program of health education. A Trust Territory-wide health book is being planned for publication this next school year. A joint program between the district education and agriculture departments has been under way for the past few years.

The development of educational materials adapted to the local cultures and printed in the local vernaculars is being encouraged. Three of our districts have small printing presses for such purposes. So great is the demand for materials of this type that this past year we requested a specialist from the South Pacific Commission to make a survey of our local facilities for such reproduction work. It is anticipated that this report, which will be available within the next month, will be of significant value to us.

#### **Public Health**

The safeguarding of the health of the Micronesians remains one of our primary concerns. Tuberculosis continues to be a serious health problem and is receiving major attention. This past year a BCG vaccination program was launched, and testing and vaccination is going on in all districts. The actual in-patient load of active tuberculosis is somewhat less than last year because of persistent treatment of cases at our hospitals and dispensaries. Fewer active cases of leprosy this past year confirm the value of the careful treatment now in process at the district hospital level. Continuous vaccination against smallpox and tetanus is carried on as a preventive medicine activity in all districts.

The inclusion of better trained Micronesians into the public health field remains the underlying and motivating factor of our overall public health program. Ten years ago there were but two qualified Micronesian medical practitioners in all of Micronesia. Since that time we have produced through training programs at Guam, Suva, and Hawaii 26 fully trained medical practitioners so that today 28 qualified Micronesian practitioners are on the job throughout the area. In addition, seven medical students currently are at the Central Medical School in Suva. Three of our medical practitioners presently are getting advanced medical work in a hospital in Hilo, Hawaii, and a fourth will go later this year.

In 1947 there were no dental practitioners in the territory. Today 19 fully qualified Micronesian dentists handle all the dental work throughout the districts under the direction of an American interdistrict supervisor.

All the territory sanitation work now is done by qualified Micronesian sanitarians directed by an American interdistrict supervisor. One of the outstanding Micronesian sanitarians last year was sent to Honolulu for specialized training and is slated to take over the interdistrict sanitation position, now filled by an American, when he returns from training.

For the last 2 years the Marshalls district has had a Micronesian director of public health, and for the past year all medical services in Ponape district have been handled completely by Micronesian staff.

The two new hospitals at Ebeye and Kusaie will be headed by licensed Micronesian medical practitioners and supported by services staffed by qualified Micronesians.

Advanced training is being given in other fields. One laboratory technician is in training in Hawaii, as are two graduate nurses. Dental graduates are receiving advanced training through the Navy in Guam. This year plans call for an advanced course in anesthesia for selected trainees at the Guam Naval Hospital. During the year a refresher course in sanitation was completed for 34 employees.

We have increased our hospital units from seven to eight this past year and by the end of the calendar year anticipate that a ninth complete hospital unit will be in operation in Kusaie. A similar out-island hospital unit for the Jaluit atoll is in the planning stage and is scheduled to be in

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operation in Jabor by 1958. New hospital construction has been completed at Rota, Truk, and Yap. Partial construction has been completed at Koror, and construction is being done at Ebeye and Kusaie.

The nursing school now is in its second year of operation in its new location in Palau and has intensified its basic-training program.

Training continues for out-island health aides at the district hospitals.

A general improvement in health conditions can be reported.

#### **Political and Social Advancement**

Ten years ago Micronesian participation in self-government had just begun. One advisory congress body had come into existence in July of 1947 in Palau, and a district council had been organized and had held one meeting in the southern Marshalls.

In the area of municipal government, half of all municipal magistrates in 1947 still held office by reason of hereditary position or by administrative appointment. Today, out of our 102 municipalities, 97 or 95 percent now elect their magistrates as well as other municipal officers. Only in five outlying islands of the Truk district do we still have magistrates that serve through hereditary status and there only because the conservatism of the island people still is strong enough for them to insist upon honoring their hereditary leader by conferring upon him the role of magistrate.

A great stride in the sphere of municipal government this past year has been the planning of a systematic program of chartering municipalities throughout the territory. Two municipalities of the Saipan district already are chartered, and four major municipalities in other districts are slated to receive charters by the end of June. Our target dates for chartering the remaining 96 municipalities are not completely determined, but according to our present program nine additional major municipalities should be chartered by the end of this calendar year, at least 16 additional ones by the end of June 1958, and five more by the end of fiscal year 1959.

The chartering of municipalities must of necessity be accompanied by an educational program, and accordingly the outlying islands will be brought slowly into the program. We hope though that by the end of 1960 most of our major

municipalities will be operating under formal charters.

Today the Palau Congress holds the distinction of being the most highly developed of all our district congresses, having been the first to achieve full legislative powers. This past year two regular sessions and one special session were held. Among the outstanding resolutions passed by the Palau Congress this year were a law governing inheritance procedures, a budget in which the district congress will take over full cost of paying elementary-school teachers, and the establishment of a special scholarship to train abroad a qualified Palauan in boat building.

In Truk district, the Fifth Annual Magistrates' Conference met last November and amongst other acts voted to establish a 2-year district scholarship to be supported by district tax funds. These local government-sponsored scholarships are of great importance since they demonstrate the interest and concern of the older, elected officials to give modern education and training to their young people. The magistrates' conference also unanimously voted to set up a district-wide congress with representatives elected directly by the people. Members of the Trusteeship Council who were present at last year's session may recall my statement that we hoped to have a district-wide congress in Truk by 1960. I am most pleased to be able to announce at this session that I have been advised by my staff that an official charter for a Truk district congress is almost ready for signature and that, if implementation goes according to schedule, the first session of the Truk district congress should be held this autumn, 3 years ahead of our previous target date.

In the Marshalls district, the former district council long since has become a full-fledged bicameral congress. Eleven resolutions of the sixth annual session received approval. These ranged from new taxation laws to a law subsidizing payment of out-island health aides.

In Ponape, the Ponape Island Congress held its fifth meeting passing resolutions on taxes, inheritance laws, trochus season, and other district affairs. This island congress also is studying ways and means to develop a true district-wide legislative body, the realization of which we hope may take place this forthcoming year.

The first chartered town in Micronesia, Kolonia, came into existence in April 1956. During the

year the town elected a council, a mayor, and other officers. The town council in cooperation with an administration grant-in-aid program is building a town council building. This will be the third such government building to be built in the Ponape district through such a joint pooling of administration and community resources.

In Yap, the Yap Island Council during the year met at regular intervals and established new taxes, raised salaries for Yap elementary-school teachers, and gave financial aid to a community-sponsored dormitory for the intermediate-school male students.

In the northern Marianas an important event of the year was the first meeting of the newly established Tinian Municipal Congress. On Saipan the Saipan Municipal Congress met for its regularly scheduled sessions.

On a territory-wide scale the political highlight of the year was the week-long Micronesian Leaders' Conference held in Guam in August 1956. Delegates were elected by representative bodies in each district to attend this conference. The success of this conference, where common problems were discussed, led to the scheduling of a similar interdistrict conference for this coming August. Already, in all of the districts, congresses and councils have elected representatives for the forthcoming conference, and even now each delegation is busy conferring with local groups on problems to be discussed. While the conference of last summer and the forthcoming one this coming August cannot as yet be described in terms of a territorial council, they nonetheless are a basic step in the development of interdistrict political consciousness.

The growing interest of districts in common problems was well demonstrated this past year by the increasing number of observers who attended congress sessions in districts other than their own. At each such session this past year one to two observers from the other districts were in attendance. We are encouraging and aiding this pattern of exchanging observers within the limits of our transportation system.

A number of other joint conferences in Guam between administration staff and Micronesians occurred during the year. In September 1956 a Trust Territory Judicial Conference was held. Micronesian representatives, judges, and clerks of courts from each district participated in the adop-

tion of a series of resolutions making recommendations for improvements in the work of the courts.

The annual meeting between administration officials and managers of chartered trading companies included for the first time Micronesian delegates chosen by the Micronesian boards of directors. These delegates took an active role in working out mutual problems faced by the trading companies and the administration.

During the most recent conference, that of the Trust Territory agriculturists, held only last month in Guam, two Micronesian agricultural project managers who were in attendance participated fully in all aspects of the conference.

We shall continue this policy of bringing representative Micronesians into Trust Territory conferences where problems that intimately concern the Micronesian people are under discussion.

The administering authority through actions such as these is attempting to set out a number of intermediate targets under which progressive growth may take place in the field of political advancement as well as in economic and social advancement.

#### **Logistics, Communication, and Supply**

The improvement of logistic support to our district centers and within the district area remains one of our major concerns. The enormity of our area, the small and scattered land units, makes this a logistic problem of considerable magnitude.

We have attempted in the past few years to achieve this improvement through the accomplishment of these major goals: that of placing the total responsibility of providing service between the outside world and the Trust Territory in the hands of established shipping firms; the gradual turning over of intradistrict shipping to qualified local companies or individuals; and lastly, to limit the role of the administration in the area of shipping to that of interdistrict ship operations.

The achievement of the first goal, that of turning over our outside shipping to established firms, is well on its way. Majuro, in the Marshalls, has been developed as a world port of call, and a well-known commercial line has been loading and unloading cargo there since 1954. During the past year this commercial shipping service was regularized so that ships now call there at the rate of one ship approximately every 2 months.

The turning over of intradistrict shipping to qualified Micronesian companies is of necessity a slow process. The cost of replacement shipping continually is rising, thus making the acquisition of new vessels prohibitive for private enterprise within the territory. Through a liberal loan policy we hope to enable qualified local companies gradually to move into such intradistrict shipping. In two districts, that of the Marshalls and Saipan, significant progress has been made in this field by local companies. In the Marshalls the purchase of a station vessel, made possible by a loan from the administration, augmented a local company's shipping service to the extent that it now handles 50 percent of all intradistrict shipping needs of the Marshalls area. Currently the administration continues to furnish the remaining logistic support for the district, but this, we hope, can be reduced gradually as the local company is able to increase its service.

In Saipan local businessmen raised \$30,000 and the administration advanced \$25,000 to organize a corporation which bought out an American-owned shipping company which has served the district for the past several years. Originally purchased to serve the islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Rota from Guam, the ship owned by the corporation has been chartered by the administration for field trips to the northern islands to pick up copra. Commercial cargo between ports on Guam, Rota, Tinian, and Saipan is carried on this vessel.

Our other districts have yet to move into this field of endeavor on any appreciable scale, but we shall continue to give every aid and encouragement to local desire to do so.

Through our fleet of amphibious SA-16 planes we have continued to provide weekly air service to each of the five main district centers and regular monthly service with frequent extra flights to the district of Rota. These planes also are used from time to time on emergency medical flights between outlying islands and the district center and between the district center and headquarters in Guam. Saipan is served by twice-weekly flights by Navy logistic aircraft.

We have continued to strengthen our radio communication system. This past year has seen the establishment of a net control center at Truk district center. From our Guam headquarters, voice contact is maintained with each of our dis-

tricts. Each district center in turn is linked with a network of out-island stations. Four years ago only five such outer-island radio stations were in existence, currently 18 are in actual operation, and 4 additional stations are scheduled for installation within the next few months. By the end of this calendar year, 22 out-island radio stations manned and maintained by Micronesians themselves will be in operation throughout the Trust Territory. Through such a network we are able to provide emergency medical aid as well as to provide information to islanders on our field-trip ship movements.

In the Marshalls district a medium-powered broadcasting station, run and maintained by the Department of Education, is on the air for 3 hours each day from Monday through Friday. Through it the education department sends educational aid to elementary schools on the out-islands and the Department of Public Health and Agriculture have regularly scheduled broadcasts.

This station also broadcasts the movements of our station vessels as they proceed from one atoll to another. This now enables Marshallese to better correlate the harvesting of their copra so as to prevent deterioration due to uncertain length of storage. The local trading companies have reported an upsurge in both quantity and quality of copra as a result in the past year.

Our training program to equip Micronesians to take over the maintenance and operation positions of our communication system has been accelerated. Of the 53 persons regularly employed in our Communication Department, 42 are Micronesians holding positions as qualified radio operators, radio mechanics, radio mechanic helpers, and communication clerks. In each of five districts the American communicator has a training program for his Micronesian employees. In one of our district centers the communication center is being operated successfully on an interim basis by the Micronesian staff while the American supervisor is on a special assignment. For 6 months of the past year all interdistrict repairs of an electronic nature were carried out solely by our Micronesian staff. One of the Micronesian radio operators currently is receiving specialized training in Honolulu. Our American communicators now are used only where a position requires extensive training, education, and experience not yet acquired by a Micronesian communicator. We are

attempting to give our local communicators such training and education as rapidly as possible.

### **Construction**

This past year we have carried out a complete reorganization of our Public Works Division both on a district and headquarters level. This reorganization has enabled us to eliminate a dual supply and maintenance setup and will make for a more efficient construction operation.

While the achievement of an adequate physical plant will still require an intensive construction program for the next 6 years or so, progress is being made in every district. \$800,000 was expended for new construction last year, and a like amount will be used this present year. Work continues on permanent facilities such as power plants, new hospital construction, administrative housing, warehouses, and harbor and dock installations in all districts. Road improvement is under way. This construction program will be continued this coming year.

### **Conclusion**

I have attempted in this brief report to sketch in broad strokes the significant progress made in the past 10 years by the administering authority as well as to cite certain of the chief accomplishments of the past year. I shall endeavor to the best of my knowledge to clarify any details on aspects of our program as may be requested during the question period.

Looking back over the 10 years since the trusteeship agreement went into effect, I feel we have moved forward on all fronts, slower perhaps in some instances than might have been desired but always toward one primary goal, that of making Micronesia a better place for people to live in as Micronesians. We have at the same time tried to equip them with the knowledge and skills they will need to meet the inevitable change that contact with our modern Western World has brought about in their lives. The steady progress made in training Micronesians to take over positions of authority is seen in the ever-increasing number of top positions that are being filled by qualified Micronesians. We confidently look forward to a continuation of this program.

The Micronesian leaders, both those schooled in the old traditional ways and those emerging younger leaders trained under our tutelage, de-

serve commendation for the manner in which they have absorbed and assimilated concepts of self-government, of economic and social advancement, and the way in which they have passed on these concepts to their people. Our task is made easier by the caliber of leaders with whom we work.

The administering authority has been guided always by the realization that the Micronesians have a heritage of old and tried traditions and had developed a way of life that had served them well on their isolated islands long before we appeared on the scene. We shall continue to respect their way of life while aiding them to acquire the tools and techniques they must have to meet the changing conditions of their modern world.

I am deeply grateful for this opportunity to present this report. I will be pleased to receive the comments of the members of this council as well as to present any additional information the members may desire in connection with this statement or our annual report.

### **Disarmament and Cessation of Nuclear Tests**

*Statement by Francis O. Wilcox<sup>1</sup>*

I should like to explain why my delegation has joined with others in proposing an amendment to the Soviet resolution on the cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons.<sup>2</sup>

Like every other organization with a concern

<sup>1</sup> Made before the resolutions committee of the 40th Conference of the International Labor Organization at Geneva, Switzerland, on June 21 (U.S. delegation press release). Mr. Wilcox is Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs. He and J. Ernest Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of Labor, were the two U.S. Government delegates to the ILO conference. For the names of other members of the U.S. delegation and an announcement of the agenda for the session, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1957, p. 1031.

<sup>2</sup> Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States introduced an amendment to a Soviet resolution proposing cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The four-power resolution, entitled "Resolution Concerning Disarmament, the Testing of Nuclear Weapons, and the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes," was adopted by the conference on June 27 by a vote of 168 to 0 with 39 abstentions. It expressed the "fervent hope that the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee may move steadily forward."

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for human welfare, the ILO is affected by the rapid advance of nuclear technology. All of us know that atomic energy has two faces: the face of its peaceful uses, benign to man and holding out promise of vast future economic benefit; and the face of its possible use in armed conflict, threatening mass destruction.

All reasonable men must ardently desire to bring to a halt any developments that seem to increase the likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflict. We know such a conflict would be a supreme disaster. I am sure that all of us want to focus our efforts on a common pursuit of ways of using atomic energy for the peaceful improvement of living standards rather than for war.

The proposed Soviet resolution singles out a particular facet of a great and complex problem. But it deals with this problem in the wrong way.

As I am sure you know, the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission is at this moment meeting in London.<sup>3</sup> Its members are attempting to reach agreement not only on the question of the testing of nuclear weapons but also on the prohibition of the production of weapons of mass destruction and on measures to limit and reduce conventional and nuclear armaments and armed forces through international agreement. Indeed, if one examines the large number of proposals which are before the Disarmament Subcommittee, the question of the testing of nuclear weapons appears as only a single though an important part of a very complicated network of issues. The relationship of weapons tests to other aspects of the disarmament problem is itself a matter under consideration.

I think it can be said that, in this and certain other aspects of the general disarmament problem, there are for the first time in years signs that some kind of progress may be possible. I would not want to be overly optimistic. It is still much too early to hazard predictions. But I believe that we are perhaps closer now to agreement on the first steps of a disarmament agreement than we have ever been.

In this connection I would stress that the work of the Subcommittee involves problems of the greatest complexity. It involves difficult technical and policy considerations in which most of us here cannot be well versed.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 1, 1957, p. 538.

In the circumstances it is wrong, and it could be harmful, for the ILO to pluck one subject of discussion in London out of its broader context and to take actions that might color or interfere with the work of the Disarmament Subcommittee. Common sense would dictate that we do nothing to upset the delicate balances existing in that body. The problem of nuclear tests, like the problem of disarmament to which it is related, ought to be left to the expert international body equipped to handle it. We do not object to a general statement by the ILO in the field of disarmament and the peaceful uses of atomic energy. But if we pick up points of detail—if we take action that involves debatable technical judgments—we diminish the weight of the resolutions of the ILO and the prestige of the organization in the world.

For these reasons the government members sponsoring the amended text have carefully restricted that text to subjects on which the ILO can legitimately and appropriately express an interest without hampering the negotiations in London. The amendment carefully avoids any attempt to pass judgment on complicated technical matters. It recalls that these questions are, under the charter of the United Nations, the responsibility of United Nations bodies: the Security Council, the General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and its Subcommittee. The amendment notes the present procedural situation under which the London meetings are taking place. It expresses the hope that the Disarmament Subcommittee may make steady progress, so that the fears aroused by competition in nuclear armaments and the anxiety caused by weapons tests may be relieved, in the interest of a secure world peace. Finally, the amendment gives voice to what I know is a universal desire in the ILO, that atomic energy may ultimately be used only for peaceful purposes in conformity with broad ILO objectives.

Through this action the ILO can lend its moral support to the work of the Disarmament Subcommittee. The sponsors of the amendment, who comprise four of the five governments involved in the London negotiations, believe that this is the most effective step the ILO can take today. I would hope that this committee would make its contribution to this objective by approving the amendment by an overwhelming vote.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Power Reactor Agreement Signed With Peru

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State announced on July 19 (press release 428) that the Governments of the United States and Peru on that day signed an agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy which will authorize U.S. assistance to Peru in developing a nuclear power program. This is the first such accord to be signed by the United States with a Latin American country.

The agreement was signed for Peru by Ambassador Fernando Berckemeyer. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., and W. F. Libby of the Atomic Energy Commission signed for the United States.

Under the agreement, which will become effective when the necessary statutory provisions of the two nations have been carried out, the United States will sell to Peru, as needed over the 10-year period of the agreement, up to 800 kilograms of uranium 235 to be contained in fuel for the startup and operation of a 21,000-kilowatt (electrical) pressurized waterpower reactor.

The reactor, to be located near the capital city of Lima, is to be designed and built by the Babcock and Wilcox Company of New York City under the authorization of the Junta de Control de Energia Atomica del Peru (Peruvian Atomic Energy Control Board). The Brown-Boveri firm of Switzerland will operate the facility. The reactor will use uranium enriched to approximately 3.35 percent 235.

The agreement will enlarge other areas of cooperation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It will supersede the research bilateral accord which has been in effect since January 1956<sup>1</sup> and provide for the purchase of gram quantities of fissionable material for laboratory research.

Peru has been a regular user of radioisotopes produced in the United States and has sent stu-

dents to the radioisotopes school operated at Oak Ridge, Tenn., for the Commission by the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies.

The president of the Junta, Gen. Jorge Sarmiento, and Peruvian scientists also participated in the Inter-American Symposium on Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Energy conducted last May at the Brookhaven National Laboratory.

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Done at New York October 26, 1956.<sup>1</sup>

Ratifications deposited: Israel, July 12, 1957; Denmark, India, and Japan, July 16, 1957; Turkey, July 19, 1957.

##### Trade and Commerce

Protocol of terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955 (TIAS 3438).

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, June 17, 1957.

Notification of intention to apply concessions received: Federal Republic of Germany, June 17, 1957, effective July 17, 1957.

#### BILATERAL

##### India

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of January 5, 1952 (TIAS 2470). Effectuated by exchange of notes at New Delhi, June 29, 1957. Entered into force June 29, 1957.

##### Jordan

Agreement granting \$10,000,000 emergency assistance to Jordan for economic development. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Amman April 29, 1957. Entered into force April 29, 1957.

General agreement providing for the furnishing of economic, technical, and related assistance to Jordan. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Amman June 25 and 27, 1957. Entered into force July 1, 1957.

Agreement granting \$10,000,000 special economic assistance to Jordan for budgetary support. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Amman June 29, 1957. Entered into force June 29, 1957.

##### Libya

Military assistance agreement. Signed at Tripoli June 30, 1957. Entered into force June 30, 1957.

Arrangement for return of equipment and material no longer needed in the furtherance of the mutual defense assistance program. Signed at Tripoli June 30, 1957. Entered into force June 30, 1957.

##### Peru

Agreement amending the agreement of May 3, 1956, for financing certain educational exchange programs (TIAS 3502). Effectuated by exchange of notes at Lima March 11 and June 13, 1957. Entered into force June 13, 1957.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>1</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3483.

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Power reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 19, 1957. Enters into force on date on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Rates or Tariffs of Fees for Official Services

#### EXECUTIVE ORDER 10718<sup>1</sup>

DELEGATING TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE THE RATES OR TARIFFS OF FEES FOR OFFICIAL SERVICES AT UNITED STATES EMBASSIES, LEGATIONS, AND CONSULATES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State the authority vested in the President by section 1745 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (22 U.S.C. 1201) to prescribe, from time to time, the rates or tariffs of fees to be charged for official services, and to designate what shall be regarded as official services, besides such as are expressly declared by law, in the business of the several embassies, legations, and consulates, and to adapt the same, by such differences as may be necessary or proper, to each embassy, legation, or consulate.

SEC. 2. This order shall not operate to amend, supersede, or terminate any rates or tariffs of fees, designations, or adaptations prescribed or made under authority of the said section 1745 and in force immediately prior to the issuance of this order; but authority to amend, supersede, or terminate the same, and to prescribe regulations necessary or desirable for the implementation of rates or tariffs of fees, designations, or adaptations heretofore or hereafter prescribed or made, shall be deemed to be included within the authority delegated by section 1 of this order.

SEC. 3. The rates or tariffs of fees and the regulations prescribed and any other actions taken by the Secretary of State under authority of this order shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
June 27, 1957.

<sup>1</sup> 22 Fed. Reg. 4632.

August 5, 1957

### Establishment of New Consulates

A consulate at Iskenderun, Turkey, was opened to the public on June 17. The principal officer at Iskenderun is John H. Morris.

Effective July 1, a consulate was officially opened at Mogadiscio, Somaliland. John B. McGrath is the principal officer at the post.

Effective July 5, a consulate was established at Yaounde, French Cameroons. Robert C. Foulon is principal officer at the post.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Mutual Understanding in the Nuclear Age—17th Semi-annual Report to Congress. Pub. 6469. International Information and Cultural Series 53. 42 pp. Limited distribution.

A pamphlet containing the report from the Secretary of State to the Congress on progress made in 1956 by the International Educational Exchange Program in promoting better understanding of the United States in other countries.

Ceylon—1957. Pub. 6474. Near and Middle Eastern Series 21. 16 pp. 15¢.

A new issue in the *Background* series, this publication includes discussion of the land, the people, political Ceylon, organization of the government, the economy, and the United States and Ceylon.

A Look at the Middle East. Pub. 6478. Near and Middle Eastern Series 24. 16 pp. 15¢.

The most recent issue in the *Background* series, this pamphlet discusses the emergence of nationalism in the Middle East, the partition of Palestine, the new regime in Egypt, and major elements of U.S. policy.

Foreign Consular Offices in the United States—April 1, 1957. Pub. 6484. Department and Foreign Service Series 65. 50 pp. 20¢.

A publication containing a complete and official listing of the foreign consular offices in the United States, together with their jurisdictions and recognized personnel.

Navigation—Establishment of Loran Transmitting Stations. TIAS 3780. 19 pp. 30¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic—Signed at Washington March 19, 1957. Entered into force March 19, 1957.

Defense—Loan of Vessels or Small Craft to Spain. TIAS 3789. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and

- Spain. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid March 9, 1957. Entered into force March 9, 1957.**
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- Entered into force September 26, 1956, and January 7, 1957, respectively.
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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

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No.	Date	Subject
423	7/15	Herter: American Bar Association.
*424	7/15	Educational exchange.
425	7/16	Dulles: news conference.
†426	7/17	U.S.-Belgian air transport consultations.
*427	7/18	Program for visit of Pakistan Prime Minister.
428	7/19	Atomic power reactor agreement with Peru.
429	7/19	Movement of refugees from Egypt.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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